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Abstract
This thesis consists of three studies of labor markets where diﬀerences in talent are associ-
ated with very large diﬀerences in income. The unifying theoretical feature is the view that
the analysis of such labor markets should take into account the scarcity of jobs, which is
a natural consequence of the combination of ﬁnite demand and positive production costs.
In Chapter 1 we propose a model where an industry-speciﬁc talent can only be revealed
on the job and publicly. Individual inability to commit to long-term contracts leaves ﬁrms
with insuﬃcient incentives to hire novices, inducing them to bid excessively for the pool
of revealed talent instead. This causes the market to be plagued with too many mediocre
workers, ineﬃciently low output levels, and excessive rents for the known high talents. We
argue that high wages in professions such as entertainment and entrepreneurship may be
explained by the nature of the talent revelation process in those markets, and suggest po-
tential natural experiments for estimating the welfare loss and the excessive talent rents
predicted by the model. Chapter 2 is an analysis of the labor market of CEOs. We present
an assignment model of managers and ﬁrms of heterogeneous talent and scale, and show
how the value of underlying ability diﬀerences can be distinguished from scale eﬀects us-
ing the observed joint distribution of CEO pay and market value. The empirical results
suggest that the observed size-pay relation in the US is mainly due to diﬀerences in ﬁrm
characteristics rather than diﬀerences in managerial ability. Chapter 3 uses a combination
of simple versions of the models of the ﬁrst two chapters to analyze the role of transfer fees
in professional sports. There workers are able to commit to long-term wage contracts, and a
transfer fee is the price of a remaining contract. We show that the abolition of transfer fees
would reallocate playing time towards older players and increase salaries by more than the
current transfer fees. All clubs, including the bigger clubs that are the current net payers
of transfer fees, would lose out in the reform.
Thesis Supervisor: Bengt Holmstro¨m
Title: Paul A. Samuelson Professor of Economics
Thesis Supervisor: David Autor
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Summary
This thesis consists of three studies of labor markets where diﬀerences in talent are associ-
ated with very large diﬀerences in income. The unifying theoretical feature is the view that
the analysis of such labor markets should take into account the scarcity of jobs, which is a
natural consequence of the combination of ﬁnite demand and positive production costs.
In Chapter 1, a model of a labor market is proposed where the level of individual ability
can only be revealed on the job and publicly. Individuals’ inability to commit to long-term
contracts leaves ﬁrms with insuﬃcient incentives to hire novices of uncertain talent, causing
them to bid excessively for the pool of revealed talent instead. This causes the market
to be plagued with too many mediocre workers and ineﬃciently low output levels, while
simultaneously raising the wages for high talents. This problem is expected to be most
severe where prior information about talent is imprecise but revealed relatively quickly on
the job, and where individual performance is highly observable and relevant for competing
ﬁrms. We argue that high wages in professions such as entertainment, team sports, and
entrepreneurship, may at least partly be explained by the nature of the talent revelation
process in those markets. This explanation is distinct from superstar economics, scale
eﬀects, and human capital models. We suggest potential natural experiments for identifying
and estimating the welfare loss and excessive talent rents predicted by the model.
Chapter 2 is a study of the labor market of CEOs. The predominant fact about executive
pay is that large ﬁrms pay more to their CEOs. This may be partly due to the higher value
of ability in larger ﬁrms, and partly to the matching of higher talent with larger scale. In a
matching market where talents as well as managerial positions are scarce, talent rents are
determined by the full distribution of talents and ﬁrms. An assignment model is presented
in which the equilibrium division of rents is solved in a manner analogous to screening
models. The capital level of ﬁrms is allowed to depend on the characteristics of the ﬁrm
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and the CEO. Assuming that management technology is multiplicatively separable from
production technology, the value of underlying ability diﬀerences can be distinguished from
scale eﬀects using the observed joint distribution of CEO pay and market value. Based
on CompuStat data on the largest 1000 US companies in 1999 we estimate the value of
managerial ability. We ﬁnd that the economic value of scarce CEO ability is about $25-37
billion in 1999, of which the CEOs received $5 billion. This suggests that the observed
size-pay relation is mainly due to diﬀerences in ﬁrm characteristics rather than diﬀerences
in ability.
Chapter 3 is a study of the role of transfer fees in professional sports, where players
can commit to binding long-term wage contracts. A transfer fee is the price of a remaining
contract which a new club has to pay to the current holder of the contract. In the EU there
has been recent pressure to end transfer fees as an illegal restriction on players’ freedom, and
possibly replacing them with some compensation for documented training costs. We present
a model where the crucial role of transfer fees comes from the allocation of scarce playing
time between players of varying levels of ability and potential. Abolition of transfer fees
would reallocate playing time towards older players with less upside potential, eventually
reducing the quality of players. We also show that the increase in player salaries can be
expected to exceed the current transfer fees for each level of talent, so that all clubs—not
just the current net recipients of transfer fees—would lose out in the reform.
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Chapter 1
Mediocrity in Talent Markets
1.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a model of a talent market where industry-speciﬁc talent can only be
revealed on the job and publicly. The two crucial features of the model are that individuals
have ﬁnite lives and that output has ﬁnite demand. This results in a scarcity of both
revealed talent and of job slots. The market price of output has an important role in
determining wages: it must adjust to accommodate the hiring of novices, without which
the industry would run out of workers. This gives a new twist to the old economic problem
of joint production of output and information about worker quality. It is shown that when
revelation of talent is relatively quick and observed performance relevant for competing
employers, then there is too little exit from the industry and too many mediocre workers
are employed. This leads not only to ineﬃciently low levels of talent and output in the
industry but also to excessively high and skewed pay for top talents.
When individuals cannot commit to long-term wage contracts, the value of information
accrues as rents to those who turn out to be high talents and see their wages bid up, while the
ﬁrms that hired them do not get rewarded for the discovery. Unless individuals are able to
pay for the opportunity to reveal their talent, ﬁrms will only take into account their expected
talent for the near term and ignore the upside potential of previously untried individuals.
Firms then prefer to hire someone who is known to be even slightly above the population
average to hiring a novice of average talent in expectation. There is thus ineﬃciently low
level of exit from the industry, especially by relatively inexperienced workers. If talent
is revealed relatively quickly, then most of the active workforce may consist of “mediocre”
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types who would exit the industry in the eﬃcient solution. Instead they stay in the industry,
producing output that crowds out entry by novices. The industry as a whole has what is
in eﬀect an up-or-out rule, but this rule is unduly lenient.1
If individuals were risk neutral and had deep pockets, then previously untried individuals
would be able to pay for the chance to ﬁnd out their talent level, up to the expected value
of their lifetime talent rents. This would lead to an eﬃcient solution, where even relatively
high talents exit the industry if their job slots have higher social value in trying to discover
even higher talent. With uncertain return to such talent, i.e. when talent rents mostly
accrue to a minority of very successful individuals, the willingness of young individuals to
pay for future rents can be much below the expected value. Credit constraints or even
moderate levels of risk aversion can cause the market outcome to deviate considerably from
full eﬃciency.
Perhaps surprisingly, the opportunity to save aggravates the ineﬃciency caused by a
credit constraint. Saving by “has-been” individuals who perform well early in their career
but who fall below population average in expected talent later allows them to outbid credit
constrained novices. Their incentive to pay for job slots is the chance of more talent rents
in the future: since talent is only revealed over time, the has-beens still retain some upside
potential, albeit less than the novices. However, after suﬃciently bad performance even the
has-beens exit, regardless of their savings.
At one level this study just provides another explanation for high and skewed wages
that is arguably plausible for many industries that appear to have high talent rents. As an
explanation it is complementary to theories based on scale eﬀects2 (see e.g. Lucas 1978 and
Rosen 1982) and superstar economics (Rosen 1981), even though less benign in the sense
that it is associated with possibly dramatic ineﬃciencies. These papers are concerned with
the eﬃcient allocation of capital (and consumers) to known talent, whereas the focus here
is on the discovery process of talent. For example, we might wonder why some alternative
manager wouldn’t be nearly as good as the current CEO with his exorbitant compensation,
scale eﬀects notwithstanding. This chapter shows how the supply of talent, as observed
in the market, can be very scarce even when it is not so in the population; and more
1Eﬃcient up-or-out rules are possible when information is match-speciﬁc, see e.g. O’Flaherty and Siow
(1995). For a signalling perspective to up-or-out rules see Waldman (1990) or Kahn and Huberman (1988).
2With a scale eﬀect or “scale-of-operations eﬀect” diﬀerences in talent are accentuated when higher talent
is matched with more productive complementary resources, such as capital.
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importantly, revealed talent can be much more scarce than it need be due to the twin
imperfection of spot contracts and credit constrained (or risk averse) individuals.
At another level, this study provides predictions about what kind of talents and indus-
tries could be expected to exhibit high and uneven wages. Inasmuch as a talent market
ﬁts the assumptions of the model, it can be expected to be ﬂooded by too many mediocre
workers. Such a market would react to certain exogenous changes, particularly to individual
commitment ability, switching costs, credit constraints, or publicness of information, in ways
that could be used to identify and quantify the ineﬃciencies described in the model. The
beneﬁt from relaxing constraints (to commitment ability or access to credit) comes through
higher exit rates for young workers, a prediction at odds with standard training and human
capital models. Higher exit rates would in turn show up as increased productivity, lower
wages and decreased wage dispersion.
Talent is equated with level of output in this study. Jobs within an industry are ho-
mogeneous, as if all workers operated identical “machines.” To say that one individual is
twice as talented as another means that he produces twice as much output (possibly in
expectation, or in quality-adjusted “hedonic” units). The economic value of talent is en-
dogenous because it depends on the market price of output. Under this deﬁnition of talent
it is meaningful to consider a thought experiment where the distribution of talent is the
same in two industries.
Several commonly studied features of labor markets are assumed away in this chapter.
There is no on-the-job training or learning-by-doing, so experience per se is not economically
valuable. Neither are there hiring or ﬁring costs, nor any organizational structure to speak
of. Information is symmetric at all times: there are no eﬀort problems, career concerns, or
adverse selection. The homogeneity of job slots rules out any problems with job assignment
within the industry.
For a talent market to be well described by this model, there should be substantial
uncertainty about the talent levels of inexperienced individuals. Success in school or per-
formance in other industries should not be a very accurate predictor of diﬀerences in talent
among inexperienced individuals, even though they may be useful as pass/fail type ﬁlters
in choosing the potential entrants. This uncertainty about talent is known in the entertain-
ment industry as the “nobody knows” property (Caves 2000). It is exceedingly diﬃcult to
forecast the success of individuals in the entertainment industry before letting the public
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experience the ﬁnished product. At the same time, the queuing for entry-level positions
and auditions is suggestive of a credit constraint. The chance to show one’s talent can turn
unknown artists into superstars virtually overnight.
The ineﬃciency described here could in principle be identiﬁed given a suitable natural
experiment. An exogenous change in individuals’ commitment ability would be ideal. For
example, the end of the studio system in the motion picture industry in the 1940s is a change
that the model predicts would lead to rehiring of mediocre talent. Under that system young
actors were able to commit to long-term contracts with motion picture companies. Available
stylized facts of decreased revenue and output, as well as the casual evidence of increased
wages, are consistent with the predictions of the model. However, contemporaneous changes,
in particular the advent of television, make it diﬃcult to draw strong conclusions.
The joint production problem of output and information about worker quality has been
well understood since Johnson (1978) and Jovanovic (1979). The social planner’s solution
in this type of problems draws on the “bandit” literature, see e.g. the treatise by Gittins
(1989). Miller (1984) uses the bandit approach in a multi-sector setting. MacDonald (1988)
presents a stochastic version of Rosen’s superstars model, where superstars are selected
based on earlier performance. These papers solve for the eﬃcient equilibrium; the focus
here is on how the market handles the discovery of talent under constraints to credit and
contracting. In this way the model is analogous to setups where ﬁrms should give training
in general skills but don’t have suﬃcient incentives, due to the same imperfections as here.
This literature uses additional imperfections, typically asymmetric information (proposed
by Greenwald 1986), to give ﬁrms incentives to train, see e.g. Acemoglu and Pischke (1998).
The plan of the chapter is as follows. In Section 1.2, a numerical example is used to
illustrate the basic ingredients of the model. Section 1.3 presents the basic model of a talent
market, with the simplest possible revelation process: individual talent is initially unknown,
and then becomes public knowledge after one period on the job. Mediocrity and the loss
associated with ineﬃcient hiring are deﬁned in an empirically quantiﬁable way. Section 1.4
extends the model to many periods, with talent revealed gradually over time. The problem
of insuﬃcient exit is shown to get worse when individuals can save. Section 1.5 discusses
the relevance of the ﬁndings for real-world talent markets, and suggests possible natural
experiments to identify and quantify the welfare cost of mediocrity. Section 1.6 concludes
the chapter.
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1.2 Example: A Simple Talent Market
Consider a competitive widget industry that combines workers with capital (machines for
making widgets). There is free entry by ﬁrms that each need one worker to operate one
machine that has rental cost of $4 million. All widgets are identical, and the number of
widgets that a ﬁrm produces depends solely on the talent of its worker (later in the chapter
it will be more natural to interpret talent as aﬀecting quality, and the market price as being
for hedonic “quality-adjusted” units of output). Industry output faces a downward-sloping
demand curve, and ﬁrms take the market price as given. There is an unlimited supply
of potential workers with an outside wage of zero. A novice is equally likely to produce
anywhere between zero and one hundred widgets.3 The talent of a novice widgetmaker is
unknown (also to himself), but becomes public knowledge after one period of work. Careers
are ﬁnite and last at most 16 periods.4 Finally, workers cannot commit to decline higher
outside wage oﬀers in the future.
Listing the assumptions
1. There is free entry by proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms, which each employ one worker and
incur a ﬁxed cost of $4 million per period.
2. The number of widgets produced is equal to the talent of the worker.
3. There is a non-binding supply of workers of unknown talent, willing to work at the
outside wage of zero, and talent is distributed uniformly in [0, 100], measured in number of
widgets produced per period.
4. A “novice” worker’s talent becomes public knowledge after one period of work. He
can then go on to work at most another 15 periods as a “veteran.”
5. Individuals cannot commit to long-term contracts.
6. The number of ﬁrms is “large” enough, so that ﬁrms take the market price as given
and there is no aggregate uncertainty.
7. There is no discounting.
How does this talent market work? That depends crucially on whether aspiring crafts-
men can pay for the opportunity to make their ﬁrst batch of widgets. There are two extreme
cases to consider. In the ﬁrst, individuals are constrained to take a non-negative wage. This
3For example, the machine could have a capacity for one hundred widgets per period, and talent could
then correspond to the proportion of successfully completed widgets.
4All numbers in this example are chosen for convenience.
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is the ineﬃcient, but at the same time also the more straightforward case. In the second
case individuals are risk neutral and not credit-constrained. As is intuitive, due to the
absence of imperfections, this is the eﬃcient benchmark.
The purpose of the example is to compare the distribution of talent and wages in the
industry under these two cases. Only the steady state is considered, where the number of
entering and exiting workers is constant over time.
Constrained Individuals
In this case all workers who turn out to be above the population average, i.e. those who
were able to make 50 widgets or more, will keep making widgets until they retire. These
veterans create more revenue than a novice in expectation, so they can always outcompete
them for a job in the widget industry.
The market price of widgets must be such that novice-hiring ﬁrms break even. Since
potential novices are not scarce, they will always be paid zero. A novice is expected to make
50 widgets, so a price of ($4 million)/(50 widgets)= $80000 ($80K) per widget is needed to
cover the capital cost. At this price there is no entry or exit of ﬁrms from the industry.
Veteran workers are always scarce. Due to free entry, ﬁrms cannot make positive proﬁts
and will bid up the wages of veteran workers, who get the diﬀerence between their revenue-
generating capacity and that of a novice as a Ricardian rent. In particular, the highest
type makes 50 more widgets than a novice or an average type. Therefore at the price of
$80K per widget, top veterans get 50 × $80K = $4 million per period. The average wage
of veterans is $2 million (since talent is uniformly distributed).
Since the production cost per worker is ﬁxed, the eﬃciency at which the demand for
widgets is satisﬁed depends solely on the average talent of workers in the industry. The
average output by veterans is 75 widgets; the average for the whole industry must be lower
since it includes the novices (it is in fact 72).5 A novice has a ﬁfty-ﬁfty chance of being
retained in the industry, in which case he will make in expectation the average veteran wage
of $2 million for 15 periods; hence the expected lifetime rents are 0.5×15×$2 million= $15
million.
5The formula that relates the fraction of novices to the rehiring threshold and the length of career is
derived in the next section.
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Unconstrained Individuals
Now suppose that aspiring widgetmakers are risk neutral and have access to unconstrained
credit. They are then willing to bid for the opportunity to make their ﬁrst batch of widgets,
up to the expected value of future talent rents. The inability to commit to long-term
contracts does not cause any problems when individuals can in eﬀect buy the ﬁrm. I will
now show that this will increase the exit/retention threshold and the average talent of
workers in the industry up to the eﬃcient level, while dramatically decreasing the talent
rents.
Start by simply assuming that novices are oﬀering $1.5 million to ﬁrms for the chance
to work (we will see shortly that this is in fact the unique equilibrium). Then at the widget
price $P , a novice-hiring ﬁrm will in expectation generate 50× $P in revenue, and have a
net cost of $2.5 million. The net cost subtracts what is in eﬀect a negative novice wage of
$1.5 million from the capital cost of $4 million. For ﬁrms to break even, the equilibrium
price of widgets must then be $P = ($2.5 million)/(50 widgets) = $50K/widget.
When novices pay to work, then veterans of average talent will not be hired into the
industry. They have no incentive to pay for a job, because they have no chance of getting
higher wages in the future. The lowest type veteran to work will do so at the outside wage
of zero.
The lowest types to stay in the industry, i.e. the threshold types, are those making 80
widgets per period. They generate enough more revenue than novices in expectation to just
oﬀset the novice payment of $1.5 million. To see this, notice that at the price $50K per
widget the additional 30 widgets that they make are worth exactly $1.5 million.
Veterans who are better than the threshold type (i.e. the 80-widget type) get rents,
again by their advantage over the threshold type. For example, the highest type makes 20
widgets more than the threshold type who is available at zero wage; therefore at the widget
price $50K the very best craftsmen get a rent of 20 × $50K = $1 million per period. The
average wage of veterans is $0.5 million (again by the uniformity assumption).
Finally, to show that this is the equilibrium, calculate the expected lifetime rents. A
novice has a 20% chance of turning out to be above the 80 widget threshold, in which case his
expected wage is the average veteran wage of $0.5 million for the last 15 periods. Expected
lifetime rents are then 0.2× 15× $0.5 million= $1.5 million, which was the assumption we
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started from. This is also the unique equilibrium, because higher oﬀers by novices increase
the exit threshold and thus decrease the expected rents.
The average output of veteran workers is 90 widgets (because veteran talent is uniform
between 80 and 100). The industry average is lower, because some workers are novices; in
fact it must be exactly 80 widgets per worker. That the optimal (i.e. maximal) average
talent level of workers is the same as the optimal exit threshold is a general result (in the
absence of discounting). Intuitively, if at the optimum some level of talent gets discarded
from the industry then it must be pulling down the industry average, while a talent that is
retained must be increasing it.
Table 1. Summary of the example.
Constrained Unconstrained
Output price $80K $50K
Threshold talent6 50 widgets 80 widgets
Average talent 72 widgets 80 widgets
Top wages $4 million $1 million
Comparison
When novices cannot pay the expected value of future talent rents, then two things happen.
First, the exit threshold in the industry is too low. As a result, many job slots are taken
over by mediocrities who reduce average talent in the industry, compared to if their job slots
were used to discover new talents. Here the workers who make between 50 and 80 widgets
per period are mediocrities in this sense; in fact most workers in the industry fall under this
category. Second, the rents to talent are higher; here the top wage goes up from $1 million
to $4 million. The talent rents accrue to the advantage in output that veterans have over
the threshold type, so a reduction in the threshold increases the rents of all retained types.
The inability of novices to pay for the job increases the price of output, because it must
be high enough to cover the cost of production at novice-hiring ﬁrms. This increased price
further magniﬁes the rents to retained talent.
6The exit rate of novices is threshold divided by 100.
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1.3 The Basic Model
This section introduces the basic model of a competitive talent market. The main interest is
in comparing the distribution of talent, wages and tenure in the industry with and without
the ability of individuals to pay to enter the industry.
Assumptions
1. Each ﬁrm employs one individual per period, has production cost c, and output equal
to the talent of the worker, θ.
2. There is an unlimited supply of individuals with unknown talent, willing to work at
outside wage w.
3. An individual’s talent level becomes public after one period of work in the industry.
He can then work in the industry up to T more periods (1 + T periods in total).
4. Talent is drawn from a distribution with a continuous and strictly increasing CDF,
F (θ), with support [θmin, θmax].
5. There is no discounting. Firms are inﬁnitely lived and maximize average per-period
proﬁts.
6. There is free entry by ﬁrms. The number of ﬁrms I is treated as a continuous variable
(measure).
7. Industry output faces a downward-sloping demand function Qd(P ).
The ﬁrst assumption describes the technology. The ﬁrms are identical; all diﬀerences
in output are caused by the talent of the worker. In other words, the level of talent is the
level of output.
Assumptions 2 and 3 describe the information structure. That all uncertainty about
talent is resolved after one period of work is a simpliﬁcation of the idea that information
about the talent of a novice is much less precise than that of experienced individuals.
Information is symmetric at all points in time: ﬁrms (as well as individuals themselves)
view all novices as identical, so they are expected to have the mean talent level θ¯. After
one period of work, an individual’s output (i.e. his talent) becomes public.
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Assumptions 4 and 5 are not essential and are made purely for technical convenience.
Assumption 6 results in a competitive industry that is “large” in the sense that there is
no uncertainty about the realization of the distribution of talent. Firms take the price of
output as given, and free entry makes sure that expected proﬁts are zero.
The additional assumptions which leads to ineﬃciency on this talent market are:
A. Individuals cannot commit to long-term contracts.
B. Individuals cannot take a wage below w, and cannot borrow against future earnings.
In terms of missing markets, the assumptions are that individuals can neither sell their
future labor nor insure their unknown talent. The case with both two assumptions will be
referred to as the case of “constrained individuals.” Assumption B approximates the idea
that the ability of novices to pay for future talent rents is small compared to their expected
value (this could also be due to risk aversion). In the absence of assumption B individuals
are assumed to be risk neutral and have access to unconstrained credit. The case with
assumption A but without B will be referred to as the case of “unconstrained individuals.”
The absence of either assumption A or B allows the industry to operate eﬃciently.
Without A, i.e. with unhindered contracting, the equilibrium is socially eﬃcient. Since
novices are not scarce, they sign up to lifelong contracts to work at outside wage w, while
ﬁrms retain the right to ﬁre the worker without further compensation. In this case ﬁrms
would choose the eﬃcient hiring/ﬁring policy.
Preliminaries
The equilibrating variable here is the exit threshold θ∗; it will be shown later that the
measure of jobs I will be determined mechanically given the threshold. Those who turn out
to have a talent level below the threshold leave the industry after just one period. Vacancies
left by novices who were not good enough to make the grade and by those retiring must be
ﬁlled by new novices. In this preliminary section I derive the relation of the exit threshold,
the equilibrium fraction of novices, and the average level of talent in the industry. With a
given exit threshold, this is just a matter of equating the ﬂows of entry and exit.
Denote the fraction of novices by i. When dealing with the distribution of talent, we
can think of the industry as consisting of a unit mass of jobs without a loss of generality.
Consider only the steady state, where i is constant over time. Each period, the talents of
i new workers are revealed, and of these a fraction F (θ∗) exit. The remaining 1 − i jobs
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in the industry must be held by veterans; of these the oldest cohort, a fraction 1T of all
veterans, retires each period. Equating exit and entry yields
iF (θ∗) +
1
T
(1− i) = i =⇒
i(θ∗) =
1
1 + T (1− F (θ∗)) . (1.1)
The distribution of workers by tenure (experience) in the industry is then i(θ∗) for t = 1
and 1T (1− i(θ∗)) for t = 2, . . . , T + 1.
The exit threshold further determines the average talent of workers in the industry.
Denote the average talent in the industry by
A ≡ iθ¯ + (1− i)E[θ|θ > θ∗]. (1.2)
Clearly A will be above the population average θ¯, because types above the threshold will
work for longer than the below-threshold types. Only if there were no ﬁltering at all, would
the industry average be equal to the population average. Substituting the equilibrium
fraction of novices (1.1) into (1.2) yields the industry average as a function of the exit
threshold.
A(θ∗) =
1
1 + T (1− F (θ∗)) θ¯ +
T (1− F (θ∗))
1 + T (1− F (θ∗))E[θ|θ > θ
∗] (1.3)
Note that, regardless of the number of jobs, the total value of output is proportional to the
average level of talent in the industry.
Social Planner’s Problem
Consider the problem of maximizing social surplus
S(I, θ∗) =
∫ IA(θ∗)
0
P d(q)dq − I (w + c) , (1.4)
where P d(q) is the inverse of the demand function Qd(P ) and I the level of employment
(measure of jobs). The social surplus is the consumer surplus from total output, i.e. em-
ployment times average talent, minus the opportunity cost of the factors of production. The
problems of choosing the eﬃcient exit threshold and the socially optimal level of employment
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have separate ﬁrst-order conditions. First of all, the threshold θ∗ should be chosen to maxi-
mize the average level of talent A in the industry. This will minimize average costs, because
cost per job is constant w+ c. Second, the level of employment should be chosen to equate
total output with demand at the minimized average cost, so that P d(IA) = (w + c)/A.
The choice of the exit threshold is essentially the choice of what fraction of jobs should
be allocated to novices; it does not matter how large the industry is. The industry as a
whole has constant returns to scale: to double the output, the amount of novices hired and
total costs would both be doubled; this would (eventually) double the number of veterans
as well.
To maximize the average talent (1.3) take the ﬁrst order condition.
∂
∂θ∗
A(θ∗) =
∂
∂θ∗
(
1
1 + T (1− F (θ∗))
{
θ¯ + T
∫ θmax
θ∗
af(a)da
})
= 0
=⇒ T f(θ
∗)
(1 + T (1− F (θ∗)))2
{
θ¯ + T (1− F (θ∗)) E[θ|θ > θ∗]}
− T θ
∗f(θ∗)
1 + T (1− F (θ∗)) = 0
=⇒ θ¯ + T (1− F (θ∗)) E[θ|θ > θ∗] = θ∗ (1 + T (1− F (θ∗))) (1.5)
The ﬁrst order condition (1.5) can be rearranged to yield the following condition:
θ∗ − θ¯ = T (1− F (θ∗)) (E[θ|θ > θ∗]− θ∗) . (1.6)
To interpret (1.6), think of the decision to hire a novice over a veteran of above-average
talent as an investment. The LHS gives the immediate loss in expected output from hiring a
novice instead of the threshold veteran. The RHS shows the expected future gain, assuming
that θ∗ is also kept as the rehiring threshold in the future.7
It is useful to notice that the maximizer of (1.3) is also its unique ﬁxed point in the
support of θ.
Proposition 1 maxθ A(θ) = argmaxθ A(θ) > θ¯.
Proof First, to see that the solution to (1.6) is a ﬁxed point of A, solve the linear
term for θ∗ and then divide both sides by 1+T (1− F (θ∗)). This reproduces the objective
7With discounting the optimal amount of this investment (into experimentation) would be lower, resulting
in a lower rehiring threshold.
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function (1.3). Second, to see that the solution exists, is unique, and strictly greater than
θ¯, notice that the LHS of (1.6) is strictly increasing, and equal to zero at θ∗ = θ¯. The RHS
is decreasing, with slope −T (1 − F (θ∗)); it starts from positive T (θ¯ − θmin) at θ∗ = θmin
and reaches zero at θ∗ = θmax. 
In other words, the optimal exit threshold is also the maximum attainable average level
of talent in the industry: A∗ = A(A∗). Intuitively, discarding a worker above the optimal
threshold must decrease the average, as must retaining a worker below the threshold. Denote
this ﬁxed point henceforth by A∗. The optimal level of employment equates supply IA∗
with demand at average cost (w + c) /A∗, so I∗ ≡ 1A∗Qd(w+cA∗ ).
Deﬁnition 1 Mediocre types: θ ∈ (θ¯, A∗). These are the talent levels above the popu-
lation average, but below the maximal attainable industry average.
In other words, “mediocrities” are people who are retained in the equilibrium with a
credit-constraint, but are not be retained in the social optimum.
Market Equilibrium
Like the social planner’s allocation, market equilibrium can also essentially be described by
the exit threshold θ∗. The level of equilibrium threshold will depend on whether individuals
are credit-constrained or not, but for a given threshold we can now deduce the equilibrium
wages, output price, and employment. In either case, the individual inability to commit
to long-term contracts means that wages are determined on a spot market. Equilibrium
wages must therefore keep ﬁrms indiﬀerent between hiring any worker in the industry for
the next period. This means that (known) diﬀerences in talent translate into corresponding
diﬀerences in wages, and into Ricardian rents for inframarginal talents. At the same time,
the price of output must adjust to allow the hiring of novices into the industry, while free
entry keeps proﬁts at zero.
Proposition 2 w(θ∗) = w.
Proof Since veterans have no future payoﬀs to think about, their decision to stay
depends solely on whether the wage they can get inside the industry is more than the
outside wage. The lowest type veteran to work in the industry is indiﬀerent and therefore
paid exactly the outside wage. 
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Proposition 3 Given an equilibrium exit threshold θ∗, the price of output is P = (w + c) /θ∗.
Proof Due to free entry ﬁrms must make zero proﬁts. In particular, a ﬁrm employing
a veteran of the threshold type θ∗ gets revenue Pθ∗ and has costs w + c. The equilibrium
price sets these equal. 
The combination of free entry by ﬁrms and a binding outside wage for veterans of
threshold type pins down the price of output.8
Proposition 4 Given an equilibrium exit threshold θ∗, wages are
w(θ) = (w + c)
(
θ
θ∗
− 1
)
+ w. (1.7)
Proof For ﬁrms to be indiﬀerent between a threshold type θ∗ and any other talent θ,
the diﬀerence in wages must just oﬀset the diﬀerence in revenue generated. Hence for any
θ
w(θ)− w(θ∗) = P (θ − θ∗) =
(
w + c
θ∗
)
(θ − θ∗) . (1.8)
Combining this with Proposition 2 completes the proof. 
Proposition 5 Given an equilibrium threshold θ∗, employment is
I(θ∗) =
1
A(θ∗)
Qd
(
w + c
θ∗
)
. (1.9)
Proof With threshold θ∗ and employment I the supply of output is IA(θ∗), (measure of
workers times average talent, i.e. average output). Set the supply equal to demand Qd(P ),
substituting in the output price from Proposition 3, and solve for I. 
Constrained Individuals Notice that Proposition 4 must also apply to novice wages:
from the ﬁrms’ point of view, novices are just like veterans with talent equal to population
average θ¯. In the constrained case, novices must always get paid exactly w. They cannot get
more, since they are not scarce, and they cannot subsist on less by assumption. Everyone
who is revealed to be better than the population average will make rents as a veteran and
8If market demand had a choke price below (w + c) /θ∗, then this industry could not operate; clearly this
is not the interesting case.
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has no reason to exit. The wages are then given by equation (1.7) with the exit threshold
at θ∗ = θ¯. The population average is an ineﬃciently low rehiring threshold: average talent
in the industry is not maximized at A(θ¯) < A∗ (by Proposition 1).
If a ﬁrm hires a novice that turns out to be above average, his wage will be bid up
by other ﬁrms. Therefore ﬁrms only care about the expected ability of a worker for the
current period. They fail to take into account the upside potential of young individuals,
who themselves are not able to pay for it due to the credit constraint.
Deﬁnition 2 The curse of mediocrity is A∗ −A(θ¯).
The curse of mediocrity is the eﬃciency loss in terms of output per worker. It could
be observed in the data if there were a shift from one case to the other, for example if the
commitment ability of individuals were suddenly removed, or if novices were to lose access
to credit. The curse of mediocrity is also associated with a lower exit rate for novices, by
F (A∗)−F (θ¯), and a lower proportion of novices in the workforce, by i(A∗)− i(θ¯). In reality,
changes to imperfections are unlikely to be of the all-or-nothing type, but the direction of
the eﬀect of more limited changes should be clear. Some potential episodes for measuring
the curse of mediocrity are discussed in section 1.5.
Unconstrained Individuals If individuals are risk neutral and have suﬃcient funds to
pay for the expected value of talent rents, then the only remaining “imperfection” is the
inability to commit to long-term contracts. That alone is not a problem because now
individuals would have no trouble in “buying the ﬁrm.” This must result in the same
eﬃcient hiring threshold and level of output as was seen in the social planner’s solution. In
addition, the distribution of wages is now also determined.9 Wages are given by equation
(1.7), with the exit threshold at θ∗ = A∗.
With constrained individuals the problem was that ﬁrms did not have the right incentives
to hire novices, and too many mediocre veterans were employed as a result. By oﬀering to
pay for the chance to work in the industry, unconstrained novices provide ﬁrms with the
right hiring and ﬁring incentives. Being risk neutral, they will pay the full expected value
of future talent rents. This makes ﬁrms prefer novices to mediocre veterans who have no
9While risk neutral workers are indiﬀerent between any gambles of the same expected value, it seems
reasonable to use the solution that is the unique limit of vanishingly small risk aversion. Note that there
are no match-speciﬁc rents and no scope for bargaining in the model.
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incentives to oﬀer such payments—whatever wage they could get in one period, they will
get for the rest of their career.
The eﬃcient exit threshold can also be derived by solving for the market equilibrium
in the unconstrained case. In equilibrium, each novice and ﬁrm takes the output price and
the exit threshold as given. Since veterans of threshold type are available at the outside
wage, novices have to pay P (θ∗ − θ¯) for their ﬁrst period job slot.10 This payment exactly
compensates a novice-hiring ﬁrm for the one-period revenue loss that it takes compared
to if it hired the threshold type. At the same time, the novice payment must be equal to
expected lifetime rents: with threshold θ∗, a novice has a probability 1 − F (θ∗) of being
retained, in which case he gets the excess revenue P (θ − θ∗) as a rent on each of the T
remaining periods of his career. This equality is the market equilibrium condition:
P (θ∗ − θ¯) = (1− F (θ∗))TP (E[θ|θ > θ∗]− θ∗) . (1.10)
The market price P factors out of the equilibrium condition, which is therefore just the
ﬁrst-order condition (1.6) in the social planner’s problem and yields the optimal threshold
A∗ as a solution. Recalling proposition 3, the price of output is therefore equal to average
cost P ∗ = (w + c) /A∗.
It is intuitive that the payment by risk neutral individuals with unconstrained credit
raises the exit threshold to the eﬃcient level: no imperfection, no problem. In the absence
of a credit-constraint, less than inﬁnite risk aversion would make novices willing to pay
something for the job and thus make them more desirable to hire than revealed average
types. This would raise the exit threshold above the population mean and reduce the
ineﬃciency. This eﬀect could be quite limited, because future income is risky (and would
be more so with a right-skewed distribution of talent). Even with unconstrained borrowing,
young individuals must take into account that they have to pay back the loan even if they
will not be retained.
To summarize, the main eﬀect of the constraint on novice ability to pay is that the
standard of performance required for an individual to continue working in the industry
is too low. The proportion of young workers is too low, while older workers are not as
talented as they would be if the job slots were used more eﬃciently in discovering talent.
10So novice wage is w − P (θ∗ − θ¯), which could be negative.
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This coincides with higher talent rents, the level of which depends on two factors. First,
rents accrue to the diﬀerence in units of output that an individual makes compared to the
threshold type; this is always higher in the constrained case since the exit threshold is lower.
Second, the value of this advantage is proportional to the price of output, which is higher
in the constrained case: when novices cannot pay for the opportunity to work, it takes a
higher output price to allow novice-hiring ﬁrms to break even. Since output price is higher,
total industry output must be lower in equilibrium. The eﬀect on employment is ambiguous
without further assumptions and is analyzed next.
Comparative Statics
Elasticity of Demand and Employment It was shown before that the price of output
must be higher in the case with credit-constrained novices. Total output must therefore
be lower, unless demand is completely inelastic. However, the eﬀect of ineﬃcient hiring on
employment (i.e. measure of jobs and ﬁrms) is ambiguous in general and depends on the
demand function.
Proposition 6 Under a constant elasticity of demand η, employment is higher in the credit
constrained case if and only if η < log
(
A∗ −A(θ¯))− log (A∗ − θ¯) .
Proof The condition for the equality of supply and demand is IA(θ∗) = γP−η, where
γ > 0 is a parameter. Inserting the equilibrium price P = (w + c)/θ∗ from Proposition 3,
we see that employment as a function of the exit threshold is I(θ∗) = γA(θ∗)(
w+c
θ∗ )
−η. The
proposition follows from solving the inequality I(θ¯) > I(A∗) for η. 
Intuitively, since the average talent of workers is lower in the constrained case, then
more workers are needed to produce the same output. If demand is suﬃciently inelastic,
then an ineﬃciently low exit threshold coincides with ineﬃciently high employment in the
industry.11
The welfare loss caused by the curse of mediocrity depends on consumer preferences.
Unless demand is completely elastic, then some of the consumer surplus gets transferred to
increased talent rents through the higher output price. For high elasticity of demand the
loss is small: consumers shift their expenses towards other products without much loss in
11This is in contrast to Frank and Cook (1995), who argue that talent markets attract too many hopefuls.
In their story, only the highest talent ends up contributing to output.
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consumer surplus, and workers and productive resources shift to other sectors. If demand is
very inelastic, then the welfare loss is worsened by the increase in jobs, because they waste
the opportunity cost of the resources being attracted into the sector. Most of the social loss
from the curse of mediocrity could come in the form of excess employment in the profession
in question.
One implication of the credit constraint case is that a monopoly would serve the con-
sumers better than a competitive industry if demand is suﬃciently elastic. Suppose that the
industry could merge into one ﬁrm, which could act as a monopsonist on the talent market.
It would then have the incentives to enforce the socially optimal exit threshold. By being
able to maximize the average level of talent in the industry, a monopolist would therefore
also minimize the average cost of production. With suﬃciently elastic demand, this would
be enough for the monopoly price to be below the competitive price. For example, with
constant elasticity of demand η, we know that a proﬁt-maximizing monopoly marks up
its price by a factor of η/ (η − 1). Since monopolists’ average cost is (w + c)/A∗, and the
competitive output price is (w+ c)/θ¯, it follows that the output price would be lower under
a monopolist if η > A∗/
(
A∗ − θ¯).12
Production Costs Consider two otherwise identical talent markets with diﬀerent cost of
production. Individuals in the high-cost industry will be earning higher rents, by the wage
equation (1.7), because the slope includes the cost c. For unconstrained novices, higher
costs would only make the wages more risky, and increase the required novice payment. In
the constrained case, a higher cost increases expected rents. Higher production costs (as
well as higher outside wage) increase rents by increasing the output price, which determines
the dollar value of talent diﬀerences.
The ineﬃciently low talent levels are not caused by a high cost of production, even
though that may seem intuitive at ﬁrst. Some positive production costs, whether from
opportunity cost of the worker or other inputs, are needed for equilibrium price to be
positive in the model. However, the distribution of talent in the industry is independent
of production cost. For example, consider the extreme case c = 0, so that the industry
consists of self-employed entrepreneurs. Their sole cost of production is the opportunity
12This does not hinge on there being a horizontal supply curve of labor. Since the monopolist can make
consumers strictly better oﬀ, the results would also go through with some monopsonist’s distortion to labor
demand.
30
cost of labor, i.e. lost wages in some other industry. The problem is not that individuals
cannot pay for the cost of production that would reveal their talent level. The problem is
that if they do so and turn out to be mediocre, they will stick around in the industry. The
masses of mediocre individuals supply output that keeps the price at a level that deters
more entry by novices. In the equilibrium with unconstrained individuals, the entrants
would suﬀer an expected ﬁrst-period loss equal to the expected lifetime rents. This would
drive down the output price to the eﬃcient level, inducing mediocre veterans to exit the
industry.
Speed of Revelation A higher number of “veteran periods” T corresponds to quicker
revelation of talent. The parameter T can be interpreted as the ratio of veteran time to
novice time, with the latter normalized at one. For any given exit threshold, a longer
veteran time means that there must be fewer novices in the industry. The average level
of talent is therefore increased for the mechanical reason that the same set of discarded
talents spends less time in the industry. In the constrained case this is the only beneﬁt: the
exit threshold is always θ¯; with higher T the average talent in the industry gets closer to
E[θ|θ > θ¯] because the below-average types get ﬁltered out faster.13
When revealed types stay around for longer, the social return to the investment of hiring
a novice is higher. In the eﬃcient solution, a quicker revelation therefore increases the exit
threshold. This can also be seen by using the ﬁxed point result (1) in reverse: since the
optimal rehiring threshold is always equal to the maximal attainable average talent level,
and the latter is increasing in T, then so must be the former.14 At the limit where talent
is revealed instantaneously there would be no need to accept anyone except the highest
possible types. For (1.6) to hold at each T, the optimum A∗(T ) must go from θ¯ to θmax as
T varies from 0 to ∞.15 Inserting these into (1.1) shows that the fraction of novices goes
from 1 to 0.
13There is a discontinuity at the limiting case of T = ∞, because this corresponds to instant revelation
(perfect information) case where only the highest types θmax would ever be hired.
14Totally diﬀerentiating the equilibrium condition (1.6) with respect to θ∗ and T , and using the envelope
theorem, yields
∂A∗(T )
∂T
= − (1− F (A
∗))
1 + T (1− F (A∗)) {E[θ|θ > A
∗]−A∗} < 0 (1.11)
15At the limit T = 0 the solution is not deﬁned: there can be no meaningful hiring policy since no
information about talent is ever revealed.
31
When revelation is slow and the veteran time short, ﬁltering is not as crucial and the
average worker talent cannot be much improved compared to the population average. When
revelation is quick, then veteran time is long and the optimal ﬁltering picky. The contrast
between the eﬃcient and ineﬃcient case is higher when the revelation is quicker, whereas
for slower revelation the problem of mediocrity is less signiﬁcant.
1.4 Gradual Learning and the Phenomenon of Has-Beens
This section extends the model by allowing information about talent to be revealed over
time. While the optimal solution is analogous to that of the basic model, the case of credit
constrained individuals is altered by the opportunity to save. I will show that, instead of
mitigating the ineﬃciency caused by a credit constraint, saving will actually make things
worse. It lowers exit rates even further below optimal, because some veterans of below-
average talent will linger in the industry.
In the basic model, individuals have essentially two-period careers, with the relative
length of the second “veteran” period described by T . All uncertainty about an individ-
ual’s talent is resolved at a single point in time, so the only variable of choice is the exit
threshold at that point. When new information about talent arrives at several points in
time, then the decision to continue must take into account the option of exiting at a later
time. Without further constraints, this would be a standard optimal stopping problem, in-
troduced into the theory of labor markets by Jovanovic (1979). In this section I explore the
general implications of a similar problem, but when job slots are scarce, learning is public
and industry-speciﬁc, and individuals have ﬁnite careers and cannot commit to long-term
contracts.
Assumptions
1. Each ﬁrm employs one worker per period, and the value of output is yt = θ + εt,
where θ is the worker’s talent and εt an i.i.d. error term.
2. There is an unlimited supply of individuals willing to work at outside wage w.
3. Individual careers last up to 1 + T periods.
4. The CDFs of θ and ε are strictly increasing, continuous, and yield ﬁnite moments.
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5. {θˆt, t} is a suﬃcient statistic for θˆt+1, where
θˆt ≡ E[θ|y1, . . . , yt] (1.12)
is the expected level of talent at tenure t (i.e. after t periods of work).
The expectation θˆt is taken with respect to the known distributions fθ and fε. For the
novices, no output has yet been observed, so θˆ0 = θ¯ for all of them. Since predictions are
unbiased by deﬁnition, E[θˆt+s|θˆt]= θˆt for any s = 1, . . . , T − t. Period t perceived talent θˆt
will often be simply referred to as talent. A crucial implication of assumptions 1 and 4 is
that the distribution of prediction errors does not become degenerate in ﬁnite time: there
is always some chance that the individual is better than he is expected to be.
Going forward in time, information about the talent of any particular worker becomes
more precise; it gets in expectation closer to the true value and moves about less. However,
it never becomes known for sure. In terms of a whole cohort, the distribution fθˆt starts
as a degenerate distribution at θ¯, and then becomes more spread out. Without ﬁltering it
would become more like the true distribution fθ; with ﬁltering, more of the lower types, as
well as some unlucky higher types, get discarded as time goes by.
Other assumptions
6. Firms maximize average per-period proﬁts.
7. There is a unit measure of ﬁrms.
8. Price of output is normalized to one.
Assumption 6 means that there is no discounting. Assumptions 6 to 8 are made in
order to simplify the notation. The extension of results from allowing free entry and an
endogenous output price is straightforward in light of section 1.3, it would cause a further
magniﬁcation of talent rents in the credit constrained case.
Social Planner’s Problem
The variable of choice is a stopping (exit) policy θ∗ = {θ∗1, . . . , θ∗T }, which consists of T
separate exit thresholds. Analogously to the single exit threshold of the basic model, this
policy states that an individual with talent θˆt < θ∗t will exit the industry. Since everyone
looks identical at t = 0, there is no meaningful choice for θ∗0 (besides θ¯). On the other hand,
after T + 1 periods, the individual will retire anyway, and the updating of θˆ based on yT+1
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is useless. Hence there are in total T points in time where a decision to continue or stop
has to be made. A decision to exit is ﬁnal, because after the exit no new information will
ever arrive that could change the decision.
The average level of talent in the industry depends on the whole stopping policy. In
line with earlier notation, denote the maximal solution by A∗ ≡ maxθ∗ A(θ∗). This would
be the object of a surplus-maximizing social planner, as well as of a ﬁrm who could keep
individuals at a ﬁxed wage. The optimal solution must adhere to the following variant of
the ﬁxed point result in Proposition 1.
Proposition 7 In the optimal solution, θ∗T = A∗.
Proof We can assume without loss of generality that there is no turnover between job
slots, since they are homogeneous. Consider then the problem of maximizing the long-run
average talent at just one job slot, at a time when the job is currently held by a tenure T
veteran of talent θˆT . If the veteran is rehired for his last period, then expected talent is θˆT
for the next period, after which a novice is necessarily hired. The long-run average from
then on is A∗. If however, the novice is discarded, then the long-run average is A∗ from this
period on. At the optimal rehiring threshold these two courses of action lead to the same
outcome, therefore θ∗T = A∗. 
Intuitively, given an individual with just one period left, the optimal decision of whether
to retain him or not depends solely on his expected talent; there is no value for any further
information about him. Thus he should be retained if and only if he contributes positively
to the average talent in the industry.
Market Equilibrium
As in the basic model, equilibrium wages are determined on the spot market, taking into
account that only individuals on their last period before retirement have no investment
decision to make—it’s all about the wages.
Proposition 8 Wages are w(θˆ) = θˆ − θ∗T + w.
Proof is a combination of two observations. First, for individuals at tenure T, the
value of continuing in the industry is simply w(θˆ) − w. The lowest type to stay is one
who gets exactly the outside wage w by doing so, hence w(θ∗T ) = w regardless of the value
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of θ∗T . Second, ﬁrms must be indiﬀerent between hiring type θ
∗
T and any worker in the
industry. The diﬀerence in current period wage between any two workers must be equal to
the diﬀerence in their expected talent. 
In Jovanovic (1979, p. 976), workers have inﬁnite lives, and this “assumption justiﬁes
the exclusion of age as an explicit argument from the wage function.” Here that exclusion
follows from the existence of a spot market for talent. The market price of talent is constant
in steady state: the economy is inﬁnitely lived, even though individuals are not.
Proposition 9 Given any θ∗T ≥ θ¯, the optimal exit policy for risk-neutral individuals is
strictly increasing in tenure: θ∗t < θ
∗
t+1.
Proof by backwards induction. First consider an individual of type θˆT = θˆ at tenure
T . His payoﬀ or “value function” is
VT (θˆ) = max{0, θˆ − θ∗T }. (1.13)
The value function gives the excess expected utility from continuing as opposed to exiting,
and zero if that diﬀerence is negative.
Next consider an individual of type θˆT−1 = θˆ at tenure T − 1. If he decides to continue,
he gets lifetime expected utility
V˜T−1(θˆ) = θˆ − θ∗T + E[VT (a)|{θˆ, T − 1}]. (1.14)
The expected utility is taken with respect to fθˆT |θˆT−1(a|θˆ). Since the expectation is increas-
ing in the prior, also (1.14) is strictly increasing in θˆ. Since the distribution functions were
assumed to be continuous, this is also continuous in θˆ. The optimal exit threshold θ∗T−1 is
deﬁned by V˜T−1(θ∗T−1) = 0.
To see that θ∗T−1 < θ
∗
T , notice that V˜T−1(θ
∗
T ) > 0, because the expectation is strictly
positive at θˆ = θ∗T (recall that the distribution of prediction errors does not become degen-
erate in ﬁnite time). Denote by V (without tilde) the value function that incorporates the
current period optimal exit policy:
VT−1(θˆ) = max{0, θˆ − θ∗T + E[VT (a)|{θˆ, T − 1}]}. (1.15)
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This is zero for θˆ ≤ θ∗T−1, and strictly increasing for θˆ > θ∗T−1.
Completing the induction backwards in time is straightforward. The value function Vt
is always zero below θ∗t , where there is a kink, and then has positive slope above. Hence
V˜t−1(θ∗t ) > 0 and θ
∗
t−1 < θ
∗
t . 
Intuitively, of two workers of the same expected ability, the younger one has always more
upside potential, because the prediction about his talent is less precise. The standards for
hiring should therefore be tougher for older workers. In terms of the market equilibrium, the
willingness to pay for a job slot is higher for a younger individual: paying for continuation
today includes the option to continue tomorrow, and other things equal, an option on an
asset with higher variance is more valuable.
Unconstrained Individuals
If individuals are risk neutral and not credit constrained, then market equilibrium must be
eﬃcient so that θ∗T = A∗. Again, the inability to commit to long-term contracts is inconse-
quential when individuals can pay the expected value of future rents to which that initial
job opportunity may lead them. Competition from novices forces incumbent individuals
to follow the socially optimal exit policy. This policy is illustrated in Figure 1-1 as the
increasing graph from
{
0, θ¯
}
to {T,A∗}. All possible individual paths for θˆ must start at θ¯;
an individual stays in the industry until retirement if and only if the path stays above the
optimal exit policy throughout. At each point in time, wages are described by the vertical
diﬀerence with the horizontal line at A∗, where they are equal to the outside wage.
With many potential points in career for exiting, the breakdown of the workforce by
tenure can no longer be captured by the fraction of novices. As in the basic model, more
novices are hired in the eﬃcient case, but the exit rates (hazard rates of exit) are in general
diﬃcult to solve.
Constrained Individuals
Proposition 10 If individuals are credit constrained, then θ∗T = θ¯, and no one will exit
while θˆt > θ¯.
Proof Novices are not scarce, so they cannot get more than outside wage w. By
assumption of being constrained, they cannot get less either. Therefore w(θ¯) = w. This
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Figure 1-1: Mediocre types and has-beens.
must also be the wage of type θˆT = θ∗T , by Proposition 8. Therefore θ
∗
T = θ¯. But then
everyone with expected talent above the population average is making rents, and will not
want to exit. 
In contrast to the basic model, here the deﬁnition of mediocrity is age-dependent. A
mediocre individual is above the population average, but below the optimal exit threshold
for his tenure. As in the basic model, there is too little exit when individuals are credit-
constrained. Mediocre individuals stay in the industry, even though their job slots would
be in better use with novices.
The mediocre talents are illustrated by the light shaded region in Figure 1-1. They are
the types with expected talent above population average but below the socially optimal exit
policy. Now the wage is equal to w at the (solid) horizontal line, and talent rents at any
point in time are given by the vertical distance from it.
If constrained individuals require at least the outside wage w regardless of past earnings,
then the actual exit policy is θ∗t = θ¯ at all t. This behavior would arise if there was no
saving, e.g. if individuals were extremely risk averse or impatient.
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The Phenomenon of Has-Beens It seems reasonable to assume that individuals
could save at least some of their rents. In this case the actual exit decision becomes path-
dependent. Novices still cannot pay for job slots, because they have had no opportunity to
accumulate savings, and this pins down wages and tenure-T exit threshold by propositions
8 and 10. Individuals would want to follow the optimal exit policy, which takes the last-
period threshold θ∗T = θ¯ as given. Whether an individual with θˆt ∈ [θ∗t , θ¯] can continue in
the industry depends on his wealth.
Proposition 11 If individuals are credit constrained, risk neutral, and are able to save,
then some veterans of tenure t = 2, . . . , T − 1 will not exit even if θˆt < θ¯.
Proof Consider an individual with θˆT−1 = θ∗T − > θ∗T−1 with a history {θˆ1, . . . , θˆT−1}
such that his savings are at least  > 0. The value of continuing is then, using the proof of
Proposition 9, VT−1(θ∗T − ). This is strictly positive by deﬁnition of θ∗T−1 from (1.15): the
individual will not exit.16 
The optimal exit policy, with θ∗T = θ¯, is only privately optimal. Anyone who can, will
follow the privately optimal exit policy. However, some individuals—including novices and
everyone whose talent drops below population average after ﬁrst period of work—are not
able to do so because of the credit constraint.
By assumption, even risk neutral individuals need to consume at least w (possibly zero)
every period to survive, but they do not mind saving all of the excess until retirement.
Savings are useful by making it possible to follow the individually optimal exit policy in the
future, should the individual’s talent dip below the population average, but not so much as
to go below θ∗t . Previously successful veterans, or “has-beens”, are able to compete against
novices for scarce job slots, who would have a higher willingness to pay were it not for their
credit constraint.
Denote the savings of an individual with history θˆt−1 ≡ {θˆ1, . . . , θˆt−1} by Wt(θˆt−1) ≡∑t−1
s=1
(
θˆt − θ¯
)
.
Proposition 12 For an individual with θˆt = θ∗t to not exit, it is suﬃcient that
Wt(θˆt−1) ≥
T∑
s=t
(
θ¯ − θ∗s
) ≡W ∗t . (1.16)
16Risk neutrality is assumed for simplicity, it is suﬃcient for individuals to be less than inﬁnitely risk
averse.
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At the threshold, the required funds are equal to the spending under the worst case
scenario, where the expected talent evolves along the stopping policy.
Proof The individual knows that on all possible paths in the future he will not be
forced to exit due to the credit-constraint. He will therefore follow the optimal exit policy
of an unconstrained individual. 
For individuals above the exit threshold θˆt > θ∗t , the required wealth for continuing is
strictly less than W ∗t . This follows already from the fact that the current required payment
for continuation is lower for a higher talent, and future prospects are at least as good. Of
course, for θˆt ≥ θ¯ the requirement is zero.
Notice that just having enough funds to pay for the next period’s job is in general
not enough for continuation to be worthwhile. This is because the expected beneﬁts of
continuation may mostly come from possible paths where the individual gets positive rents
only several periods from now. As a result, some exiting individuals have positive savings.
Deﬁnition 3 Has-beens. Individuals with θˆt ∈ [θ∗t , θ¯] and Wt ≥ W ∗t (θˆt), where 1 < t <
T and θ∗t is part of the privately optimal exit policy that takes w(θ¯) = w as given.
A has-been must have once been successful enough to have suﬃcient funds to continue.17
He is currently below population average by expectation, but above the privately optimal
exit policy. The presence of any has-beens in the workforce means that the eﬃciency loss
in terms of average talent in the industry is now at least A∗ −A(θ¯1).
Where could we observe “has-beens” in the sense deﬁned here? In the movie industry,
a has-been could be an actor who used to be a star and made large talent rents, but has
ﬂopped more recently. He then uses savings from earlier rents to participate in the ﬁnancing
of a movie, which makes negative proﬁts in expectation, but oﬀers him a role and a chance
at a resurrection. For him, this gamble has a positive expected value, because a successful
comeback would generate more talent rents in the future. However, it is socially ineﬃcient,
because novices would have an even higher willingness to pay for the role, but they do not
have the funds to bid for it.
Interpretation as One-Sided Long-Term Contracts Suppose ﬁrms can commit
to a lifetime wage-policy, including severance payment policy, but individuals cannot commit
17MacDonald (2001) studies has-beens with a vintage human capital model under uncertainty about future
technological change.
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to contracts that require them to make payments to the ﬁrm at any time in the future. Now
the accumulated wealth Wt would be analogous to money “in escrow” at the ﬁrm, which
must always be nonnegative. In the simplest contract individuals would get w until they
exit, upon which the ﬁrm pays out Wt. Some separations result from insuﬃcient funds in
escrow, but even they can involve severance payments by the ﬁrm. When the escrow is full,
i.e. Wt ≥W ∗t , exit is voluntary: the worker quits to stop the bleeding of the escrow because
he has fallen below the privately optimal exit policy θ∗t .
More interestingly, the contract could also include wages above w before separation or
retirement. For suﬃciently good histories, the escrow balance can reach a point where
no amount of bad news in the future could ever cause the individual to be ﬁred due to
insuﬃcient funds. In terms of the spot contract world, the wealth constraint can no longer
become binding until T because Wt ≥ W ∗t , even though the privately optimal exit policy
can still become binding after suﬃciently bad performance. This allows the ﬁrm to start
unloading the account with payments above w, up to the point where the remaining balance
is W ∗t .
The result that a worker’s escrow can reach a ﬁring-proof level W ∗t is reminiscent of the
“tenure standard” of Harris and Weiss (1984), but this is a diﬀerent phenomenon. In their
paper, for a suﬃciently good history of performance, the expected marginal product of a
worker reaches a level where the ﬁrm knows it can never again fall below the outside wage.
A crucial assumption there is that output consists of successes that arrive as a Poisson
process and that failures are not possible: the magnitude of the worst possible news, i.e.
lack of news for the rest of career, is therefore bounded below.
Firms’ ability to commit to long-term contracts does not improve eﬃciency here, it
merely allows a diﬀerent interpretation of the equilibrium. Addition of unobservable ef-
fort would let the escrow serve the useful purpose of (imperfectly) mimicking an up-front
performance bond, as in Akerlof and Katz (1989), something which credit-constrained indi-
viduals are unable to post. Also, if individuals were both credit-constrained and risk averse,
then one-sided long-term contracts would allow ﬁrms to provide insurance, as in Harris and
Holmstro¨m (1982). The diﬀerence here is that wage insurance against type realizations
below θ∗T is provided by the outside wage (turning out to be a bad actor does not diminish
one’s prospects as a dishwasher). Note that there is no scope for wage insurance in the
basic model, because workers do not face downside risk: novices know that they will make
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at least their current wage in the future, and veterans know that their type (and wages)
will stay constant until retirement.
1.5 Applications
The prototypical and most high-proﬁle talent markets are found in the entertainment in-
dustry. There job performance is almost entirely publicly observable and success of young
talents hard to predict. Neither formal education nor on-the-job training seem to play a
large role in explaining wage diﬀerences in these industries. The chance to reveal one’s tal-
ent in a real job is precious: this, and the presence of credit constraints, is suggested by the
queuing for positions and auditions. Testing and other artiﬁcial ways to assess talent seem
to have limited usefulness beyond reducing the number of candidates for any entry-level po-
sition. There simply is no good substitute for observing the success of actual end-products.
Richard Caves (2000) has dubbed this uncertainty the “nobody knows” property, as the ﬁrst
on a list of distinctive and pervasive characteristics of the entertainment industry. It could
be said that in the entertainment trades ﬁnding out about someone’s talent is largely ﬁnd-
ing out about the tastes of the public, but this distinction is not operational for analytical
purposes.
For a talent market to be analyzable with this model, it should exhibit certain broad
features. There should be relatively high exit rates early on (this is true without long-term
commitment, although more so with it). The level of talent should be imprecisely known at
the entry level, and then become known relatively quickly once in the industry. This would
appear as a quick increase in within-cohort income dispersion among the “survivors” in the
industry (under long-term contracting, only among free agents). Observed performance in
one ﬁrm should be a good predictor of performance at other ﬁrms, i.e. match-speciﬁcity
should not be too important. If these conditions hold, and if there is reason to believe
that novice-hiring ﬁrms are not compensated for the talent they discover, then this would
suggest the potential for ineﬃciencies and excess talent rents described in the model.
There are many models to describe markets for talent that are consistent with stylized
facts about entertainment industry, such as high and skewed income distribution. Just
observing a talent market under one set of institutions does not allow one to show the
existence, not to mention estimate the magnitude, of any ineﬃciencies. Besides comparing
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models by the plausibility of their assumptions, it would of course be desirable to try
to identify and quantify “the curse of mediocrity” proposed in this chapter. This would
require an exogenous change in one of the imperfections behind the ineﬃciency—a natural
experiment. The ideal experiment would be a surprise legal change from full individual
commitment ability to none or vice versa. Such a change would also allow the quantiﬁcation
of the economic value of commitment ability, and its impact on within-profession income
inequality. While the model of this chapter is not suﬃciently rich to allow a careful empirical
analysis of such natural experiments, it can be used to shed light on stylized facts and to
suggest potential empirical applications.18
1.5.1 Motion Pictures
The motion picture industry in Hollywood operated under the so-called studio system from
1920s to late 1940s. In this system, artists and other inputs were assembled together
within a studio under long-term relationships. As a part of the system, entering actors
made exclusive seven-year contracts with movie studios.19 This kept their compensation
at moderate levels until the initial seven years came to an end, even if they became big
stars meanwhile. This allowed studios to capture much of any increase in an artists’ worth
during the contract. The studios could rent the artist to other studios on “loan-outs” (for
which they charged a premium from the renter), but the artist had no right to quit or refuse
roles. The contracts did not provide insurance. Even though wages were speciﬁed for the
whole contract period (typically including moderate increases), the studios had the right to
terminate the contract every six or twelve months.
A successful lawsuit by actress Olivia de Havilland, resolved in 1945, made a crucial
part of these long-term contracts unenforceable. She had been hired by WB (Warner Bros.)
in 1935, having been an unknown protagonist of a college theater play. She quickly proved
very popular with both audiences and critics and won her ﬁrst Oscar nomination four years
into the contract, which she then attempted to renegotiate. She refused roles oﬀered by
WB, and as a result did not work for six months. At the end of the contract WB claimed
that the skipped six months should be added to the contractual obligation, since the original
18A careful empirical analysis would require—besides good data of course—a dynamic model that takes
into account how a market adjusts from one steady state to another (which can in principle take a lifetime),
and how it reacts to demand shocks. This depends on features that do not make a diﬀerence to the steady
state, most importantly, whether previously exited individuals can come back to the industry later.
19The seven-year limitation on personal service contracts dates back to 1890s.
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contract required her to actually work for seven years.20 WB lost, and the “De Havilland
decision” made long term contracts less useful, as it gave more renegotiating power to artists
who turn out to be big stars.
At the same time, the studio system came under ﬁre from the Justice Department, which
ﬁled an anti-trust lawsuit against Paramount Pictures in 1938. This suit accused the eight
major studios, which among them produced 95% of movies, of monopolizing the motion
picture industry by restraining trade and ﬁxing prices. The main thrust of the suit was
aimed at the vertical integration of movie theaters and studios. The Supreme court decision
in 1948 forced the studios to divest from movie theaters, which is commonly thought to have
ended the studio system. Whatever the reason, the system of long-term contracting ended
in the 1940s. After the change, movies have been produced as one-time aﬀairs, where an
entrepreneur-producer assembles a line of talents and other inputs for one movie only.21
According to the model, the end of long term contracting should have led to insuﬃcient
exit of mediocre entertainers, showing up as substitution from unexperienced actors to
experienced (but relatively less paid) actors, to higher and more uneven incomes for veteran
actors, and to lower total revenue. The wages of star actors on their initial contract during
the studio system can be expected to be lower for obvious reasons. More interestingly, the
contractual situation of free agents (those past the initial seven years) under the studio
system is comparable to actors with the same amount of experience under spot contracting.
During the studio system, there should have been a higher supply of talent due to better
use of movie roles in discovering talent, moderating also the wages of star free agents. After
the change, the share of less experienced actors should have gone down, but the special
nature of the product makes predictions about the age structure less clear-cut: actors of
diﬀerent ages are not well substitutable, as the actor’s age must be matched with that of
the character in the script. Yet to the degree that it is feasible, the end of the studio system
should have led to actors being older than their roles.
A major diﬃculty of the episode is that other things were far from equal. The advent of
television in the late 40s and early 50s is a major technological shock, aﬀecting both demand
20Sources: Screen Actors Guild History Page, www.sag.org, and Capellon & McCann trial lawyers,
www.cappellomccann.com.
21It has also been suggested that the system unraveled because of 90% personal income tax rates during
World War II. This caused individuals to set up their own production companies to shift taxable income
toward dividends (also complicating any empirical analysis), which were taxed at 60%. See Stanley (1978),
Chapter 3. Presumably too frequent dealing with the same studio would have exposed the tax dodge.
However, the return of lower tax rates did not bring back the studio system.
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for actors and movie tickets. The motion picture industry was left with a comparative
advantage in high quality (e.g. color ﬁlm), but the market for actors was probably integrated
across these two media, something which a serious empirical analysis should also take into
account.
Unfortunately, the wage data for actors is lacking. According to Caves (2000, p. 389),
“no systematic data have been assembled on whether the studios’ disintegration brought more
rents into the stars’ hands, but casual evidence suggests that it did.” There is more concrete
evidence of a post-war decline in revenue and output at movie studios. The number of movies
made was down 48% from the 1940 level in 1956, while revenues declined by 19%; again,
this fact is diﬃcult to interpret without quantifying the impact of television.22 Interestingly
though, in terms of quality, the era from the 1920s to the 1940s is often referred to as the
golden age of Hollywood movies. For example, according to ﬁlm director Peter Bogdanovich
“It was a whole system that found actors who were unusual, not necessarily versatile in the
way we think of versatile actors today, but actors who had a personality, who had a certain
quality ... there was a whole system to that, and it was extraordinary and produced the
greatest array of star actors in the history of the world.”23
1.5.2 Record Deals
Exclusive record deals, by which musicians agree to make a certain number of albums for
the same record company, are a form of long-term commitment similar to what used to
be possible in the motion picture industry. This arrangement is possible in the record
industry, because record deals are exempt from the seven year limitation on the length of
personal service contracts. Challenges similar to the De Havilland case were forestalled by
the California legislature in 1987, when it was decreed that record companies retain rights
to the agreed number of albums by an artist, even if seven years has passed since the signing
of contract.24
The music industry is very competitive at the entry level, where upstart bands and artists
are free agents, but agree to exclusive contracts in exchange of production, distribution, and
promotion by the record company. The production cost alone for a typical record is from
22Average costs (available for two studios) roughly doubled at the same time, but I have not found data
on the share of wage costs. Figures are from Conant (1960), Chapter 5.
23MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour, PBS, July 3, 1997.
24This amendment is Subsection B of California Labor Code Section 2855.
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$100,000 up,25 but the biggest cost may be the opportunity cost of promoting one band
rather than another. The scarcity of attention of programming directors for radio stations
and people looking for new music for record shops means that a record by its mere existence
has little chance of becoming known. The prospects of which artist will become a big seller
are very uncertain. About 80-90% of records by new artists end up making a loss—this must
be compensated by the small number of very proﬁtable hits. For the record companies, the
most proﬁtable hits are those by artists still on their initial low-paying contracts.
However, the eﬃcacy of the system is constantly threatened by attempts to renege or
renegotiate by those who turn out to be big stars and end up getting paid much less than
their current “market price” (high-proﬁle cases include Prince and George Michael). The
quality of the product is obviously not contractible, and artists can fulﬁll contractual re-
quirements (or try to force a renegotiation) with a substandard product, though at a reputa-
tional cost to themselves. Furthermore, there is currently a lobbying battle in the Congress
involving RIAA (Recording Industry Association of America) and AFTRA (American Fed-
eration of Television and Radio Artists) about the continued application of the seven-album
amendment. Were the current system of record deals to break down, the proportion of new
artists and new releases can be expected to be reduced, while the proportion of new artists
breaking even and making a second record should go up. A reduced proportion of “failed
artists” would be a sign of reduced experimentation and lower eﬃciency.
1.5.3 Professional Team Sports
Professional team sports in North America have very unusual labor markets, mainly because
the ﬁrms are organized into leagues that are close to natural monopsonies in their specialized
labor markets. The leagues have devised rules that restrict ﬁrms from competing for each
others’ employees. In particular, potential novice players (“rookies”) are each assigned to
a single ﬁrm, which then has the sole right to negotiate with that particular player (the
allocation of these monopsony rights is known as the “draft”). Under the “reserve clause”
system, players cannot leave for other ﬁrms at will, but employers can always sell the player’s
contract to another ﬁrm. This system was upheld by a U.S. supreme court ruling, Flood
v Kuhn (1972), against a challenge by baseball player Curt Flood who had been traded
against his will.
25Vogel (2001).
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Players have responded to owners’ monopsony power by unionization, leading to occa-
sional strikes.26 Baseball players achieved some concessions through collective bargaining
in 1975, after which players reaching six years of league experience became eligible for free
agency, where all teams are free to bid for their services. This change seems to have been
anticipated, and 1975 was more like a culmination of gradual unraveling than a sudden
shift. The change is only applicable to a minority of players however, since slightly more
than half of careers do not last long enough for a player to get a contract as a free agent.
The exit (hazard) rates of major league baseball players indicate that a major shift took
place in the 1950s. In the ﬁrst half of the century, more than half (52.8%) of players exited
after no more than three seasons, and over two thirds (68.2%) by the end of their sixth
year.27 From 1960 to 1990 these rates were down to 33% and 50.1% respectively, without
a signiﬁcant break at 1975. For rookies the exit rate was 35.7% before 1950, and 17.2%
after 1960. Meanwhile the average age of new players has stayed at 24 years, while the
number of teams and players has been growing. Further investigation would be necessary
to establish the cause of the shift in exit rates, but based on the model in this chapter,
increasing (re)negotiating power of players is a prime candidate.
The accuracy of information about novice talent in professional sports remains an open
question under the reserve clause. The draft makes it nearly impossible to evaluate the
economic value of expected talent diﬀerences between novice players.28 If prior information
is very inaccurate, then the draft should not make much diﬀerence to wages.29 On the
other hand, if the rookies also diﬀer from each other substantially by the expected value of
their talent, then the reserve clause is both rent extraction (the draft) and remedy to the
curse of mediocrity (enforced long term commitment) bundled in one. However, instead
of being just a transfer of rents from owners to players, as usually claimed by pundits, an
implication of the model is that complete free agency could be expected to cause a welfare
loss. It would lead to lower exit rates for young players, lower average quality of players
and lower total revenue. In total, players gain less than the owners lose.
26First collective bargaining agreement is from 1968; there have been ﬁve strikes and three lockouts in
major league baseball since then.
27Based on data from Sean Lahman’s website “The Baseball Archive,”
www.baseball1.com.
28Occasional barter between teams, where draft numbers are traded for free agents, could allow some
inference.
29According to Rottenberg (1956), “the process by which players are brought to the major leagues can be
likened to that by which paying oil wells are brought in or patentable inventions discovered.”
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A similar but potentially much stronger natural experiment may be about to start in
Europe, where the system of transfer fees in professional soccer is under scrutiny by EU
labor regulators. There young players start as free agents but have the right to commit
to binding long-term contracts, the length of which can be negotiated.30 Casual evidence
suggests that entry level information about talent is very inaccurate compared to what is
known 4-5 years later. If transferable contracts become unenforceable, then players can be
expected to gain more than will be the loss to owners and consumers; at the same time, the
age distribution of players should move upwards.
1.5.4 Entrepreneurship
It may be useful to think of the market where entrepreneurs and venture capitalists meet
as a talent market. This market would exhibit the curse of mediocrity if two conditions
are met. First, the success of a new ﬁrm should depend on the talent of its founding
entrepreneur, of which relatively little is known until after his ﬁrst project is ﬁnanced.
Second, entrepreneurs should be able to go on to found new companies later in their career,
and the proﬁts of these new ﬁrms cannot be claimed by the ﬁnanciers of previous ﬁrms. In
this case, much of the expected value of ﬁnancing a start-up by a novice entrepreneur is not
contractible, because it will accrue to the entrepreneur through proﬁts of future projects.
As a result, the investment decisions of venture capitalists do not take into account the
value of information produced about the abilities of the entrepreneur, only the expected
proﬁts from the current project. There is too little investment into projects of inexperienced
entrepreneurs, while too many mediocre entrepreneurs go on to found more companies. The
mediocrities’ new companies are proﬁtable by expectation, but they are not as proﬁtable as
is the expected lifetime proﬁtability of novice entrepreneurs’ projects, taking into account
that unsuccessful entrepreneurs will be ﬁltered out of the market. Known entrepreneurial
talent is artiﬁcially scarce, leading to excessive incomes for incumbent entrepreneurs. Under
these circumstances, we could also expect to see has-been entrepreneurs using their own
wealth from previous projects to try to bounce back into talent rents.
30In some European countries the contract length became freely negotiable only after the 1995 “Bosman
decision,” until which a player’s old team could require a transfer fee from the new team, even at the end of
the contract.
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1.6 Conclusion
This chapter has presented a model of a labor market where individual talent can only
be revealed on the job. Firms face a joint production problem of output and information
about talent, the optimal solution to which has been well understood at least since Jovanovic
(1979). In this study it is assumed that individuals cannot commit to long-term contracts
and that learning about talent is public, so wages are determined on a spot market for
talent. The distinguishing feature in this study is the scarcity of job slots and the focus on
the case where individuals are credit constrained. The problem is that ﬁrms do not have
incentives to hire novices, who themselves cannot pay to be hired. As a result, there are
too many mediocre workers, who are better than novices by expectation, but not talented
enough to justify them taking up scarce job slots that could also be used to try discover
higher talent. Wages are always higher in the ineﬃcient case because revealed talent is
more scarce than it need be, and because the price of output (and so the value of talent) is
higher.
The model presents a rather bleak picture of talent markets. Most labor markets are
markets for ex-ante unobservable talent to some extent. The markets for lawyers, copywrit-
ers, and college professors are among potential cases not explored in this chapter. Whether
a labor market exhibits the ineﬃciency and excess rents described in this chapter, and
whether these are economically signiﬁcant, is of course an empirical question. Estimation
would require an exogenous change to one of the imperfections behind the ineﬃciency, but
such changes are rare. This chapter suggested potential natural experiments from the enter-
tainment industry for detecting and quantifying these problems, but a careful investigation
is left for future research. If the diﬀerences in talent that are only discovered on the job are
indeed economically signiﬁcant, then much of observed superstar wages could be a symptom
of potentially large ineﬃciencies, resulting from limitations to contracting.
Occupational licensing is a straightforward solution to the problem of insuﬃcient exit.
If workers are required, after a certain amount of experience, to have shown a certain level
of talent to stay in the industry, then setting this requirement at the eﬃcient threshold
would result in the best achievable distribution of talent in the industry. Equivalently, if
all ﬁrms had a large number of jobs, then it would be suﬃcient to require them to set
aside a certain proportion of jobs to novices. Instead of relying on a benevolent regulator,
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this arrangement could be achieved as a collusive outcome between ﬁrms, and might even
be allowed by anti-trust legislation, unlike the more simple solution of ﬁrms agreeing not
to bid for each others workers. The result is the same: less retaining of mediocre talents,
and lower wages. Under free entry this “industry standard” would end up beneﬁting the
consumers by lowering the price of output.
The frictionless and informationally transparent spot market assumed in this study all
but precludes private solutions to the problem. Firms have no incentives to invest into
organizational capital, in the sense of Prescott and Visscher (1980). If learning were not
completely public, or if there were other frictions in the labor market (such as switching
costs), then ﬁrms would get a part of the rents from the talent they discover and would
have some incentives to hire novices over mediocrities. For example, in the signalling model
of Waldman (1984), competing employers only observe the job category of workers, but
can infer the average quality of workers in each category. This leads to underpromotion
of workers to the high-productivity job, because promotion must involve a discontinuous
wage increase. In light of this study, it seems that models that yield underpromotion in
equilibrium could result in overpromotion from the point of view of social eﬃciency, if they
were augmented with a credit constraint and scarce job slots. A further extension into
heterogeneous jobs would connect this model with the literature on how organizations use
diﬀerent types of job slots to “breed” high-ability workers, possibly with strategic inter-
actions between ﬁrms. The most relevant models would be Guasch and Sobel (1983) and
Demougin and Siow (1994, 1996).
The most pressing theoretical extension to this model is the addition of heterogeneous
jobs. This could be done by using an assignment model approach presented by Sattinger
(1979, 1993), or a model where individuals form teams, as in Kremer (1993), or even with
a model that integrates not only learning and job assignment, but also on-the-job training,
along the lines of Gibbons andWaldman (1999). In each case, this extension would deﬁnitely
overturn one apparent conclusion of this chapter, namely that frictions are always good for
eﬃciency. This “feature” is an artifact of assumed job homogeneity and is not robust to
a within-industry matching problem. With job heterogeneity, the eﬃcient matching of
workers and jobs is subject to change over the lifetime of a cohort as new information
becomes available. A limited amount of “poaching” can then be beneﬁcial because it allows
workers to move to jobs where their talent has higher productivity. When individuals have
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limited commitment ability, this mobility comes at the cost of worsened incentives for the
hiring of novices. Reaching full eﬃciency gets harder when jobs are heterogeneous: it is not
enough for individuals to be able to commit to work for a particular ﬁrm; they should be
able to commit to a contract that can be sold to other ﬁrms.
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Chapter 2
The Diﬀerence That CEOs Make:
An Assignment Model Approach
2.1 Introduction
It is a well known fact that larger ﬁrms pay more to their CEOs. The elasticity of CEO
pay to ﬁrm size has been estimated at about 0.3 across industries and time with various
measures of ﬁrm size.1 The literature on executive compensation has mainly focused on
the structure of incentive pay, while the level of pay has received much less attention. Most
studies end up attributing the diﬀerences in pay levels to diﬀerent optimal eﬀort or risk
levels, for which the essentially homogenous CEOs must be compensated. In this study
the distribution of CEO pay is analyzed as the outcome of a competitive equilibrium in a
market where heterogeneous ﬁrms and individuals match. The goal is to disentangle scale
eﬀects from inherent ability diﬀerences in explaining the observed pay diﬀerences and to
estimate the social value of scarce executive ability.
It seems fairly intuitive that the observed strong relation of ﬁrm size and CEO pay levels
is a manifestation of scarce executive ability being worth more to larger ﬁrms, because the
economic impact of a manager’s decisions depends on the amount of resources under his
control. That this relation results in high levels and skewed distribution of income for CEOs
was proposed by Mayer (1960) who used the term “scale-of-operations” eﬀect. In similar
spirit, Manne (1965) argued that a major beneﬁt of corporate mergers and takeovers is to
1See for example Kostiuk (1999), whose data goes back to 1930’s, and the survey by Murphy (1999).
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allow the allocation of the control of resources to be adjusted to managerial abilities. Lucas
(1978) invoked Manne’s suggestion to devise a theory of ﬁrm size distribution based on the
allocation of capital to a population of potential managers of heterogeneous ability. Rosen
(1982) presented a related model with a focus on the division of labor into managers and
workers and the allocation of subordinate labor between managers. In these models all
size diﬀerences between ﬁrms are due to diﬀerences in managerial ability, although better
economies of scale increase the skewness of the distributions of ﬁrm size and managerial
pay.
In assessing the value of CEO ability it must be taken into account that each ﬁrm has
only one CEO, and that each individual can work in only one ﬁrm at a time. If not just
individuals but also ﬁrms have important indivisible characteristics then this simple fact has
far-reaching implications for the understanding of CEO pay levels. An assignment model is
called for; for early assignment models see Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) and Tinbergen
(1956, 1957). The assignment model used here builds on the “diﬀerential rents” model of
Sattinger (1979) by introducing adjustable capital that can be freely allocated between the
matched pairs of ﬁrms and managers. Sattinger’s setup has a continuous distribution of
workers and ﬁrms which rules out match-speciﬁc rents and therefore any need for bargaining,
and a complementary production function which guarantees positive assortative matching
(here meaning the matching of the best managers with the largest ﬁrms).2
This chapter presents a new approach to assignment models by describing distributions
in terms of their inverse distribution functions or “proﬁles.” The crucial variable describing
individuals is now their quantile in the distribution of ability, and not the level of ability
which typically lacks a natural scale of measurement. The distributions of factor incomes
are solved in a manner analogous to the standard method of solving screening models. I
believe this quantile approach to be more intuitive and tractable than working with density
functions, especially when considering empirical applications. In particular, this approach
makes it clear how the rents accruing to the ability of an inframarginal individual are equal
to her marginal productivity, deﬁned with respect to total industry output while taking
into account the resulting reassignment of ﬁrms and other individuals if she were to exit
the industry.
2See also the survey by Sattinger (1993) which includes a detailed exposition of the “diﬀerential rents”
model.
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The basic assumption of this chapter is that there is a competitive and frictionless
labor market for executive ability which is equally applicable in all companies, but is more
productive at larger companies.3 Even though all ﬁrms would rather hire the most able
individual for the job, it is the companies with the highest absolute value for that ability
that will pay the most for it and therefore attract the best individuals. In equilibrium each
ﬁrm must prefer hiring its CEO at her equilibrium pay level to hiring any other company’s
CEO at their pay level. At the same time, the levels of adjustable capital must equalize its
marginal product across ﬁrms at the market rate of return. The pay levels of individuals
depend on the distributions of ﬁrm size and CEO ability in the economy.
A general lesson of assignment models is that the income distributions of cooperating
factors must be analyzed together. A regression approach, such as estimating an earnings
function, could be wildly misleading. In the empirical section of this chapter, I use the
assignment model to analyze the dependence of the pay distribution on the distributions of
individual and ﬁrm characteristics. Using the observed joint distribution of CEO pay and
shareholder income, the model can be used to answer various quantitative questions about
the eﬀects of CEO ability on social surplus and CEO pay. These questions necessarily take
the form of counterfactuals about one distribution of factor quality while holding the other
constant. Furthermore, here the sensitivity of some results to the assumed value of a free
parameter in the model (the elasticity of output with respect to capital) means that only
the counterfactuals about the distribution of ability yield meaningful results. Many other
questions cannot even conceivably be answered if the model is taken seriously.4
This study has the polar opposite approach to CEO pay of most of the literature be-
cause the structure of pay is not considered, only the level. Diﬀerences in required eﬀort
or risk-bearing are in eﬀect assumed away as possible explanations for the variation in pay
levels in favor of diﬀerences in individual ability and ﬁrm-speciﬁc usefulness for that abil-
ity.5 Undoubtedly incentive pay is needed to align the interests of managers with those of
the shareholders in a ﬁrm of any size. In a perfect contractual world the eﬀective ability
3Parrino (1997) provides evidence for positive assortative matching in the market for CEOs (as well as
for substantial frictions). He shows that succesful CEOs that switch ﬁrms are more likely to move to a larger
company.
4For example, due to the assumed lack of frictions, any movements of CEOs between ﬁrms would only
reﬂect changes in information about their ability and could not be used to identify the value of their ability;
although this can be sensible within other models (e.g. Hayes and Schaefer 1999).
5Assumed away are also explanations based on dishonesty such as the skimming explanation in Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2001).
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that managers provide would be higher for each inherent ability level. In this sense the
model hides all incentive problems under the levels of ability, and the expected cost of a
CEO’s compensation is simply the market price of her managerial ability. A somewhat
similarly motivated paper within the incentive literature by Baker and Hall (2002) explores
the relation of incentives and ﬁrm size while assuming away diﬀerences in ability. In their
model, eﬀort and ﬁrm size are allowed to be complementary, so the optimal level of eﬀort
and sensitivity of compensation to market value depend on ﬁrm size. Using cross-sectional
data on the structure of CEO pay and ﬁrm size, they ﬁnd evidence for a substantial comple-
mentarity: the estimated elasticity of the marginal productivity of CEO eﬀort with respect
to ﬁrm size is about 0.4.
For an assignment model to be tested and estimated, one would need to observe individ-
ual and ﬁrm characteristics that well capture the variation in management ability and ﬁrm
size but have not been aﬀected by the characteristics of one’s matching partner. Further-
more, these would have to be observed over time and with suﬃcient exogenous variation
in the shapes of the distributions. This is too much to ask for in the case of CEOs and
ﬁrms, but the model can still be used to answer quantitative questions by assuming a func-
tional form for the relation of output to unobservable ability and ﬁrm size. The value of
within-sample diﬀerences in managerial ability can be estimated under the assumption that
eﬀects of managerial ability are multiplicatively separable from production technology and
unobserved ﬁrm characteristics.
For the empirical implementation I use CompuStat data on the 1000 largest publicly
traded companies in the US in 1999 (companies with market value above $614 million). The
main quantity of interest is the diﬀerence that their CEOs make to total economic surplus,
compared to the counterfactual case where they would only have the same undetermined
baseline ability as the lowest type CEO in the sample. This value was about $25-37 billion
in 1999, of which the CEOs’ received $5 billion. Another counterfactual is random matching
within the sample: the implied social value of sorting the top 1000 CEOs by company size is
estimated at $11-15 billion. Finally, the diﬀerence in pay levels between the CEOs of smallest
and largest sample companies decreases by about a factor of ten in the counterfactual case
where all ﬁrms are similar to the current 1000th largest ﬁrm. It could be said that the bulk
of the observed size-pay relationship is explained by the exogenous diﬀerences in ﬁrm size
(rather than by diﬀerences in managerial ability).
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The chapter is divided into two parts. In the theoretical part (Section 2) an assignment
model is presented, where ﬁrms and individuals of exogenous qualities match, and where
the level of capital can be adjusted according to the quality of the match. It is shown
how the division of surplus into factor incomes depends on the distributions of individual
and ﬁrm characteristics. The nonstandard intuition of assignment models is discussed and
clariﬁed. In Section 3 the model is applied to CEO pay. It is shown how the ability proﬁle
of individuals can be inferred, up to a constant of proportionality, from the observed joint
distribution of CEO pay and market value of ﬁrms. The model is used to estimate the
value of CEO ability in the largest U.S. companies, under various assumptions about the
elasticity of output with respect to capital. The chapter is concluded with a discussion of
the results.
2.2 An Assignment Model of Pay
In an assignment model productive resources are embedded in indivisible units and these
units must be combined in ﬁxed numbers to produce output. Here the units are individ-
uals and ﬁrms, and they are matched one with one. A production function describes the
resulting output from any individual with any ﬁrm as a function of their characteristics. I
make three simplifying assumptions about the production function: one-dimensionality of
inputs, continuity, and complementarity. The ﬁrst two assumptions are made for analyti-
cal convenience, while the complementarity assumption is central to the whole approach.
Further assumptions are symmetric information and risk neutral ﬁrms.
The ﬁrst assumption is that individual and ﬁrm characteristics aﬀecting output can both
be summed up by one number. If these characteristics are denoted by x and z respectively,
then the output from matching individual i and ﬁrm j can be written as yij = Y (xi, zj) =
Y (a(xi), b(zj)). In other words, units of input have one-dimensional suﬃcient statistics
with respect to output; these statistics will be referred to simply as “ability” and “size”,
denoted by a and b respectively. The units of measurement of ability and size are only
deﬁned up to a positive monotonic transformation, but there is an unambiguous ranking
of individuals and ﬁrms by their productivity that is independent of who they are being
matched with. Note that diﬀerent individuals can have diﬀerent “strengths”, i.e. diﬀerent
components of x contributing to their ability to aﬀect output. These diﬀerent components
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can be complements as well as substitutes, only the “aggregate” qualities of the factors
must be complementary to guarantee positive sorting.
Second, it is assumed that the production function is continuous and strictly increasing
in both of its arguments, and that there is a unit mass of individuals and ﬁrms with
“smoothly” distributed characteristics. The distributions of a and b have continuous ﬁnite
supports and no atoms; the resulting distributions of output and factor incomes will inherit
these properties. Dispensing with this assumption would only complicate the notation
without bringing more insights.
The substantive assumption is that of complementarity. When the production function
has a positive cross-partial, then eﬃciency requires positive assortative matching: the best
individual must be matched with the largest ﬁrm, the second best with the second largest
etc. If the sorting were not perfect, then total output could be increased by shifting some
individuals between ﬁrms.6 The individuals and ﬁrms are thus matched in the simplest pos-
sible way in equilibrium. The determination of output is very straightforward, its division
into factor incomes is what requires further analysis.
It will be convenient to refer to distributions by their inverse distribution functions or
“proﬁles”. Think of the individuals as ordered by their ability on the unit interval, so that
a[i] is the ability of the i:th quantile of individuals and a′[i] > 0. In general, when the mass
of “observations” is normalized at one, then the proﬁle of any positively sorted variable is
also its inverse distribution function. Denoting the distribution function by Fa, the proﬁle
of a is deﬁned by
a[i] = a st. Fa(a) = i. (2.1)
The slope of the proﬁle is the inverse of the density:
a′[i] =
1
fa(a)
st. Fa(a) = i. (2.2)
a′′[i] = − f
′
a(a)
fa(a)3
st. Fa(a) = i (2.3)
If there were atoms in the distribution of a they would correspond to ﬂat parts in the proﬁle,
6Positive assortative matching (“positive sorting”) maximizes the output from matching a1 ≤ a2 and
b1 ≤ b2 if Y (a1, b1)+Y (a2, b2) ≥ Y (a1, b2)+Y (a2, b1). Rearranging this inequality to Y (a2, b2)−Y (a1, b2) ≥
Y (a2, b1)−Y (a1, b1) illustrates the fact that complementarity can also be deﬁned as “increasing diﬀerences”
in the production function.
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while gaps in the support of a would appear as jumps.
2.2.1 The Determination of Factor Incomes
In a competitive equilibrium, the proﬁles of factor incomes must support the eﬃcient match-
ing of individuals and ﬁrms, which we know involves perfect sorting. Two types of conditions
must hold in competitive equilibrium. First, there are the sorting constraints: all ﬁrms must
prefer hiring their eﬃcient match at the equilibrium wage to hiring any other individual at
their equilibrium wage. Second, there are the participation constraints: all ﬁrms and indi-
viduals must be earning at least their outside income. Notice that the sorting constraints
look like incentive compatibility conditions in a typical nonlinear pricing problem.
Y (a[i], b[i]) − w[i] ≥ Y (a[j], b[i])− w[j] ∀i, j ∈ [0, 1] SC(i, j)
Y (a[i], b[i]) − w[i] ≥ π0 ∀i ∈ [0, 1] PC-b[i]
w[i] ≥ w0 ∀i ∈ [0, 1] PC-a[i]
(2.4)
The outside opportunities are assumed to be the same for all units of a given factor.7 The
unit mass should be thought of as a normalization of the mass of pairs of individuals and
ﬁrms that are active in equilibrium. The lowest active ﬁrm-individual pair is the one that
just breaks even with the outside opportunity:8 Y (a[0], b[0]) = π0 + w0. The ﬁrms are not
residual claimants in any sense: the equilibrium conditions could equivalently be stated in
terms of individuals hiring ﬁrms.
As in the mathematically analogous nonlinear pricing problem, the amount of constraints
can be reduced drastically by noticing that for any i ≥ j ≥ k, the sum of two adjacent sorting
conditions SC(i, j)+SC(j, k) implies SC(i, k). The binding constraints are the marginal
sorting constraints that keep ﬁrms from wanting to hire the next best individual, and the
participation constraints of the lowest types. Regrouping the sorting constraint SC(i, i− ε)
and dividing it by ε gives
Y (a[i], b[i])− Y (a[i− ε], b[i])
ε
≥ w[i]− w[i− ε]
ε
. (2.5)
7A weaker assumption would do here, namely that the outside opportunities increase slower along the
proﬁle than the equilibrium wage does.
8If the amount of available factor units were binding, so that even the lowest types more than break even,
then the lowest types of the binding factor would get a positive rent.
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This becomes an equality as ε→ 0 and, via the deﬁnition of the (partial) derivative, yields
the slope of the wage proﬁle.
w′[i] = Ya(a[i], b[i])a′[i] (2.6)
The wage proﬁle itself is then obtained by integrating the slope and adding in the binding
participation constraint w[0] = w0.
w[i] = w0 +
∫ i
0
Ya(a[j], b[j])a′[j]dj (2.7)
Analogously, or from y = π + w, the proﬁle of proﬁts is
π[i] = π0 +
∫ i
0
Yb(a[j], b[j])b′[j]dj. (2.8)
All inframarginal pairs produce a surplus over the sum of their outside opportunities, and
the division of this surplus depends on the distributions of factor quality. At any given
point in the proﬁle, i.e. at any given quantile, the increase in surplus is shared between the
factors in proportion to their contributions to the increase at that quantile.
Because of the continuity assumptions, the factor owners don’t earn rents over their next
best opportunity within the industry. In a discrete model there would be a match-speciﬁc
rent left for bargaining, as the diﬀerence in the pay of two “neighboring” individuals could be
anywhere between the diﬀerences of their ﬁrms’ willingness to pay for the ability diﬀerence
between them. In a continuous model there is nothing to be bargained over because all
units have arbitrarily close competitors (there would be match-speciﬁc rents only if both
factor proﬁles had a jump at the exact same quantile).
2.2.2 Adjustable Factors
The distributions of factor qualities are exogenous in the model, in which the factor incomes
are determined in a spot market, and depend on the distributions of factor qualities. The
model allows adjustable factors, but they don’t have to show up explicitly, if their levels
are assumed to be chosen optimally so that they are just functions of the exogenous factor
qualities. The output as deﬁned so far is then really the surplus from the match or output net
of the cost of adjustable factors. Denoting the adjustable factors by k, the (net) production
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function is
Y (a, b) = max
k≥0
{
Y˜ (a, b,k)− c(a, b,k)
}
, (2.9)
where Y˜ is gross output. For the production function to be complementary, it is suﬃcient
that all factors, including the adjustable ones, are complements in the surplus maximization
problem. Factors that are purchased at constant unit cost must have decreasing returns to
scale for a ﬁnite maximizer to exist.
The adjustable factors could further be divided into those that can be adjusted instantly
or in the short run, such as eﬀort, and those that must be chosen before the matching takes
place and can only be adjusted in the long run, such as education. However, this distinc-
tion is not necessary when there is no uncertainty about the matching partner, because
then everyone just chooses the optimal level of investment into long-run adjustable factors.
There is no room for strategic behavior, such as ﬁrms or individuals threatening to invest
suboptimally, because there are no match-speciﬁc rents.9
Some factors that can be adjusted in the short run may be “third party” inputs, such as
raw materials and labor, that are purchased on the spot market. Other adjustable factors
are embedded in one of the factor units, making it likely to confound the cost of these
adjustable factors with the true compensation or rent of the ﬁxed factor quality. This
confusion is the reason for having to think about them. For example, education is clearly
inseparable from a particular individual. Disentangling the cost of education from a rent
to talent is of course a classic identiﬁcation problem in economics.
For a simple case, which will be used later in the empirical part of the chapter, suppose
that ﬁrms can rent capital at constant unit cost r and that the gross production function
is Y˜ (a, b, k) = abkθ. The (net) production function gives the surplus that will be divided
between the ﬁxed factors according to the assignment model.
Y (a, b) ≡ max
k
{
abkθ − rk
}
. (2.10)
The optimal capital level is k∗(a, b) =
(
θ
rab
) 1
1−θ , which results in the following multiplica-
9With uncertainty about the quality of the match, the optimal pre-matching investment would depend
on the whole distribution of possible matches.
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tively separable closed-form production function
Y (a, b) = (1− θ)
(
θ
r
) θ
1−θ
(ab)
1
1−θ . (2.11)
Adjustable capital is complementary with both a and b, so the production function has the
complementarity property. A solution is guaranteed by decreasing returns, θ ∈ [0, 1). The
factor incomes of a and b are again determined from equations (2.7) and (2.8), with (2.11)
serving as the production function. The payment to adjustable capital is rk∗(a, b), and is
likely to be mixed with the “factor income” of b, which could be an economic proﬁt or a
payment for previously sunk capital (more about this in the next section).
For the division of surplus, it does not matter into which factor the adjustable factors
are physically or legally embedded in. For example, if higher eﬀort levels increase output
mainly by increasing the marginal productivity of b (if Y˜be >> Y˜ae), and there is suﬃcient
variation in b, then the economic return from higher eﬀort levels goes mainly to ﬁrms, while
individuals are mostly just reimbursed for the cost of eﬀort (i.e. its “reservation price”).
The possibility to adjust the levels of some factors aﬀects the division of surplus by aﬀecting
the productivity of the ﬁxed factors, regardless of whether these are apparently “controlled”
by one party or another.
It is straightforward to add more variables, as long as the complementarity assumption
is not violated. Costly eﬀort (or education) e can be added to the maximization problem,
here in a way that interacts the cost with ability.
Y (a, b) ≡ max
e,k≥0
{
Y˜ (a, b, e, k)− c(e, a)− rk
}
. (2.12)
The payments to the owners of the ﬁrm include the cost of adjustable capital. Similarly, a
part of the wage is a compensation for the cost of eﬀort c(e∗(a, b), a), and the remainder is
a payment to a scarce ability or talent.
The eﬀort-cost function can serve as a simple reduced-form way to incorporate the
ramiﬁcations of informational asymmetries between owners and managers. As is well known,
the surplus-maximizing actions by the manager are not achievable under a wide range
of circumstances. A partial alleviation of this problem is possible but costly, requiring
individual compensation to be made in a form that the individual values below its market
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price. This is a waste of money, compared to a perfect information, complete contract world,
and should be included in the eﬀort cost. An innovation in contracting technology could
correspond to a downward shift in c(·, a): with better contracts, individuals of any given
ability supply more eﬀort at any given cost (or more realistically, eﬀort is more accurately
directed towards increased surplus). The distributional eﬀects of such an innovation are not
a priori clear, but depend on the strength of complementarities between eﬀort, ability and
ﬁrm size.
2.2.3 The Determinants of Firm Size Diﬀerences
The inalienability of ability is very natural, because it so palpably can not be moved from one
person to another. But what are the ﬁxed ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics that can’t be chopped
into pieces and shuﬄed between ﬁrms? For there to be many exogenously heterogeneous
ﬁrms, there must also be some productive resources that are indivisible in nature and
of heterogeneous quality, as well as some limitations for combining these resources under
the management of a single individual. In other words, decreasing returns to scale are
required on two fronts: in allocating more adjustable (divisible) resources into one ﬁrm,
and in merging more ﬁxed (indivisible) resources under the management of one individual.
Without decreasing returns all resources complementary to talent should be allocated to
the most talented individual.
There are inescapable decreasing returns to management ability stemming from the
scarce attention of individuals, who must specialize their ability to some extent. Diﬀerent
ﬁrms do diﬀerent things. Each ﬁrm operates in a slightly diﬀerent market niche, and one
individual can only be up-to-date about a limited number of niches at a time, at least
suﬃciently enough to manage a ﬁrm that operates in them. The abilities of the managers
are of course themselves determinants of the size of the market where the ﬁrms operate;
by size of niche I mean the exogenous component in the determinants of size, inherent in
consumers’ preferences and technology. Even if all managers were exactly equal in ability,
there would be vast size diﬀerences between ﬁrms. Manufacturing of wide-body aircraft is
going to be a bigger business than building yachts, and probably separate from it, under
most circumstances.
The exogenous component in the size of the ﬁrm is the ﬁxed ﬁrm-speciﬁc variable with
which managerial ability is complementary. Managerial ability makes a larger absolute
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diﬀerence to surplus in a ﬁrm that occupies a larger niche. These two factors together
result in a scale-of-operations eﬀect and diﬀerential rents. The possibility to adjust the
levels of other variables, such as capital and labor, may further enhance this eﬀect.10
As the most extreme case of loss-of-focus, any individual could only specialize in man-
aging operations in a market for only one particular variety of goods at any given time, and
the goods diﬀer by their demand curves. At the other extreme, it could be that product
varieties of equal demand shares are divided into bundles of markets, within which the same
specialized managerial knowledge applies. A large niche then stands for a large bundle of
varieties that are feasible to combine eﬃciently under one management. Either way, ﬁrms
inhabiting the largest niches (i.e. those with largest b) hire the best managers. There ap-
pears to be a rent for being a ﬁrm in an attractive high-demand niche, but this expected
rent should have been dissipated back when it was decided who got to enter that niche
(perhaps in a patent race, or through premature entry, or as a rent to a talented founder).
The explicit inclusion of adjustable factors adds this assignment model some of the ﬂavor
of the models of Lucas (1978) and Rosen (1982), where one heterogeneous factor, namely
managers, gives rise to a distribution of ﬁrm size and rents to management ability. In these
models all diﬀerences between ﬁrms arise from the ability of their manager. The manager
in eﬀect sets up the ﬁrm, by renting the capital and hiring the subordinates, pays their
market price, and then claims the residual as his own compensation. The size distribution
of ﬁrms is solely a reﬂection of the economy’s solution to allocating productive resources to
diﬀerent managers: if all individuals were equally apt, then all ﬁrms would also be identical.
The determination of CEO pay in these models is akin to the previous case with adjustable
capital, but with a degenerate distribution of b.
2.2.4 Understanding the Assignment Model
A central feature to understand about the assignment model is that ﬁxed unit-speciﬁc
characteristics are essentially ordinal. Any increasing transformation of “the scale of mea-
surement” for a factor quality, combined with the inverse change in the functional form
of the production function, changes nothing of substance in the model. This means, for
example, that using a Cobb-Douglas form Y (a, b) = Aaθb1−θ, as opposed to a simple mul-
10A bull market could be interpreted as an across-the-board increase in the exogeneous components of
ﬁrm size (which is measured in market value). CEO pay levels should then be procyclical (and in apparent
deﬁance of relative performance evaluation), as has been pointed out by Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000).
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tiplicative y = ab, would be superﬂuous, or even misleading if it causes one to believe that
the income shares should have a tendency to be related to the exponents. This is a special
case of a more general mistake of assuming that factors are paid their marginal products,
in a situation where the amounts of factors can not be shifted across diﬀerent units of
production. This transferability of factors across units is what pins down the linear scale
of measurement for a factor quality in the usual case: the sum of the factors in the whole
economy must adhere to some budget constraint. In an assignment model there is less
ﬂexibility. The collection of factor units is what it is, and the economic problem is how to
combine these factor units into units of production.
The quality of factor units can not be measured in dollars or units of output, because
there is another ﬁxed factor that the units must be combined with for there to be any
output.11 What can be deﬁned in dollars is the diﬀerence that two factor units make,
when matched with a particular type of a counterpart. For example, Y (a2, b) − Y (a1, b)
is the value of the ability diﬀerence between individuals of abilities a2 and a1, if matched
with a ﬁrm of type b. This diﬀerence is increasing in b for a2 > a1 by the assumption of
complementarity.
The Quantile Scale Since the qualities of ﬁxed factors are essentially ordinal vari-
ables, any increasing scale of measurement for them can be chosen by adjusting the pro-
duction function accordingly. With the distributions of factor qualities ﬁxed, the most
convenient scale is obtained by using the quantiles as the measures of factor quality. This
amounts to using the CDFs of the qualities as the positive monotone transformation al-
lowed by the model. Deﬁned this way, the production function Y (i, j) gives the output
from matching an individual in the ith quantile with a ﬁrm in the jth quantile. This choice
of units is well suited for illustrating the eﬀects of changes in technology.
The unit square in Figure 2-1 covers all possible matches, with the quantiles of the two
factors as the coordinates. The production function deﬁnes a surface over the quantile pairs,
the height of which is the level of output. This height is w0 + π0 at the origin, when the
size of the industry is limited by the participation constraint of the lowest types.12 The
11The only exception is the trivial case when the eﬀects of diﬀerent factors do not interact, i.e.when they
are additive. In this case there would be no reason to expect assortative matching or correlation of factor
incomes.
12There could be inactive types at negative “quantiles” outside the ﬁgure, for which the output with the
equilibrium match does not cover the opportunity costs.
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Figure 2-1: The isoquants of the production function on a quantile scale.
isoquants (contour lines) represent the combinations of individual and ﬁrm quantiles that
would result in the same level of output. With this choice of units, both factor qualities
are distributed uniformly in [0, 1]. The pairs that match in equilibrium are located on the
45-degree line, and there is a uniform mass of pairs on every point on the line.
The division of surplus at any quantile—at any point on the matching line—depends
on the slopes of all the isoquants at the points of intersection below. The slope of the wage
proﬁle (2.6) is now simply w′[i] = ∂∂iY (i, j)|j=i ≡ Yi(i, i). The proportion of wages of the
increase in output along the proﬁle is
w′[i]
y′[i]
=
Yi(i, i)
Yi(i, i) + Yj(i, i)
=
1
1 + Yj(i,i)Yi(i,i)
. (2.13)
The ratio in the denominator is the slope of the isoquant, evaluated at the matching line.
It is the marginal rate of substitution between quantiles of individuals and ﬁrms in the
following sense. Consider a pair (i, j) that would produce an output Y (i, j) if matched.
If you wanted to form a pair that produces the same output as the pair (i, j), but with a
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lower ranked individual, then it would need a higher-ranked ﬁrm to match with, and this
MRS tells you the local trade-oﬀ in terms of quantiles for attaining the same level of out-
put. With individuals on the vertical axes, steeper sloped isoquants mean that individuals
make a smaller diﬀerence to output at the margin. In other words, individuals are more
substitutable for other individuals at the margin, so the MRS (deﬁned with Yi in the de-
nominator) is lower. This results in a larger denominator for (2.13), and a share w′/y′ that
is closer to zero.
The marginal rate of substitution between ﬁrms and individuals determines the division
of surplus, but it only matters along the graph of equilibrium matching. Even large changes
in (potential) output oﬀ the equilibrium matching graph have no eﬀect on factor incomes,
unless they become large enough to break the complementarity. On the contrary, small
changes in technology that change the slopes of the isoquants near the 45-degree line can
have a large cumulative impact on the division of surplus above, even if equilibrium output
is unaﬀected (picture the isoquants rotating around the 45-degree line).
The Multiplicative case A simple and intuitively comprehendible speciﬁcation that
is very suitable for graphical illustration is the multiplicatively separable production func-
tion, of which Cobb-Douglas is a special case. The graphical convenience of multiplicativity
comes from the simple fact that the level of output from matching a and b is the rectangle be-
tween ab and the origin. Therefore a basically three-dimensional problem can be illustrated
in two dimensions. The matching graph a = ϕ(b), deﬁned by {(a, b) st Fa(a) = Fb(b)}, can
be any strictly increasing curve. Its slope is
ϕ′(b) = a′[Fb(b)]fb(b) =
a′[i]
b′[i]
∣∣∣∣
i=Fb(b)
. (2.14)
Note, however, that the matching graph alone does not tell how the mass of pairs is dis-
tributed on top of it, only that there is a positive mass. Changes in the distributions of
factor qualities appear as changes in the shape of the matching graph. For example, if
individuals become more able, in the sense of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance, then the
matching graph shifts up.
The area of the smaller rectangle in Figure 2-2 is the break-even level of output, y[0] =
a[0]b[0], that just covers the reservation prices of the factors. The division of this minimum
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Figure 2-2: The multiplicative case.
output is exogenous; here the shaded triangle represents the reservation pay of individuals
w[0]. Inframarginal types i > 0 create a surplus y[i]− y[0], whose division depends on the
distributions of a and b in a very simple way: the surplus of individual i is represented by
the area between a[i] and a[0] and to the left of the matching graph. While moving up
the matching graph (so also up the proﬁle), the size of the rectangle representing output
increases. The contribution of a higher a to this increase is proportional to the horizontal
side of the rectangle, which is b = ϕ−1(a).13 Conversely, the marginal productivity of b is
ϕ(b).
13The division of surplus can also be deduced by changing the variable of integration in the wage equation
(2.7) from quantile j to ability a. Then j(a) = Fa(a),
dj
da
= 1
a′[j] and b[j(a)] = ϕ
−1(a). This results in
w[i]− w[0] =
∫ i
0
a′[j]b[j]dj =
∫ a[i]
a[0]
ϕ−1(a)da, (2.15)
which is indeed the area of the shaded region between a[i] and a[0].
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The wage of any type of an individual can be read oﬀ the graph in a similar matter; the
entire shaded region represents the wage of the highest type a[1]. Note again that wage is
not merely a function of ability, but depends on the whole distribution of a and b below.
The distributions of ability and wages are not seen in the ﬁgure: the matching graph gives
a relation between distributions of a and b, but it is consistent with many combinations of
distributions. One could imagine another dimension above the graph describing the density
of individual-ﬁrm pairs; no restrictions are required on the shape of this density.
To illustrate the model’s nonstandard implications, it is useful to do a comparative
statics exercise with the distribution of abilities as the variable. Suppose that the ability of
individuals between quantiles i∗ and 1 is increased, while the qualities of ﬁrms and other
individuals are unchanged. The new matching graph is shown by the line above the smaller
shaded region in the ﬁgure. The distribution of b is not changed, so the quantiles move
vertically: the ith quantile is matching exactly above where it used to. It can be seen that
the pay levels of highest type individuals must go down, even though the amount of surplus
produced is up at every ﬁrm in (i∗, 1), and unchanged elsewhere. The loss in the pay of the
very highest type a[1] is the entire dark shaded region.
The income of the lower range of the improved quantiles goes up as a result of the
change, as might be expected. Individuals gain from increased productivity, but can also
lose due to tougher competition from other individuals below. The income for all ability
levels a[i] for i > i∗ is reduced by the amount of the dark shaded region between a[i] and
a[i∗], the eﬀect of tougher competition from below, and gain by the amount of the light
shaded region between a[i] and a[i∗], the eﬀect of increased ability. From this it already
follows that the highest types must be worse oﬀ, since all they get is this loss. Of course, if
everyone’s ability is increased suﬃciently, then everyone can also be better oﬀ. For this it
would be necessary for the highest level of ability to increase enough to retain a suﬃcient
relative advantage over its lower-ability competitors. Inspection of the wage equation (2.7)
reveals that a suﬃcient condition for everyone’s pay to increase is that the slope of the
ability proﬁle should increase at every quantile.
From the point of view of the other factor, the gains are unambiguous: all ﬁrms of
types b[i∗] or above are better oﬀ than before. The dark region to the left of b[i], for any
i ∈ (i∗, 1], is the resulting gain for ﬁrm i. The converse result holds if a section of ﬁrms
became inherently “more productive”, i.e. experienced an increase in b. Individuals of lower
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ability would feel no “trickle-down” eﬀect from increased productivity at the higher-level
ﬁrms, but instead there would be a trickle-up eﬀect. High-ability individuals gain whether
the level of output at their ﬁrm is increased or not, because the value of ability at lower-
ranked ﬁrms has been increased, shifting the division of surplus to individual’s favor.14
These comparative statics results can be summed up in terms of ﬁrst order stochastic
dominance in an interval that excludes the maximum. If the new distribution of ability
dominates its old distribution, and the distribution of ﬁrm size is held ﬁxed, then the
new distribution of pay levels does not dominate its old distribution, whereas the new
distribution of proﬁts does dominate its old distribution (vice versa for a change in ﬁrm size
distribution).
Finally, suppose that there is a general increase in productivity, as if a multiplicative
parameter in the production function were to increase.15 This merely changes the labels
on the isoquants, but has no eﬀect on the matching graph or the slopes of the isoquants,
and therefore can not aﬀect the division of surplus, except by potentially changing the size
of the industry. If the quality of either of the factors increased proportionally all across
the distribution, then the gains from this improvement would be shared by both factors in
proportion to their current shares of the surplus. To be exact, this neutrality would require
the outside opportunities to be increased in the same proportion as productivity within the
industry; if not, then the size of the exogenously divided break-even output is decreased in
the ﬁgure and some previously inactive ﬁrm-individual pairs will enter. The division of their
surplus depends on the shape of the matching graph inside the old break-even rectangle.16
This example also illustrates why merely studying an earnings function can be mislead-
ing. Equilibrium relations such as w(a), or equivalently w(b), depend on the distributions
14If the price of output (so far normalized to one) was decreasing in total industry output, then lower-
ranked individuals would actually be worse oﬀ, and the industry would contract in size (employment) as the
least proﬁtable ﬁrms could no longer break even at the reduced output price.
15In the multiplicatively separable case, so including Cobb-Douglas, an increase in general productivity
is, by its eﬀects, indistinguishable from a factor augmenting advance in technology: neither changes the
substitutability between factor units. Both types of changes cancel out from (2.13).
16For a completely diﬀerent example, suppose that the factors of production are a population of breeding
studs and mares and that variables a and b fully describe their genetic qualities. Surmise then that each
beast can only be used in a limited number of breedings each period where a foal of expected present value
ab is produced (to be used in horse-racing or something). It would make no sense to say that either the studs
or the mares contribute more to the price of foals, since they are both needed for there to be any oﬀspring
at all. In the price of any foal the contribution of the stud and the mare can only be evaluated in relation
to what the prices would have been had they been coupled with other studs and mares in the population.
In general, if one factor of production is very homogenous in quality then most of the variation in diﬀerence
made to output and in factor incomes occurs among the heterogenous factor.
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of a and b. Even if ability and the earnings function were observed directly, it would give
the wrong predictions about (even the signs of) the changes in earnings, if more than a zero
measure of individuals were to change in ability. It is arguably more sensible to think of the
distributions of factor incomes as the primary variables of interest, rather than a functional
relationship between factor incomes and factor qualities, since the latter are measured on
arbitrary scale.
Marginal Productivity Redeﬁned It is often claimed that wages are not equal to
marginal productivity when the economy faces an assignment problem.17 It would indeed
be misleading to say that factors earn their marginal productivity by the usual deﬁnition of
marginal productivity. The marginal productivity of the ability of an individual of ability
a is Ya(a, ϕ−1(a)). This is the marginal increase in output if he were to increase in ability,
while still matched with a ﬁrm of type b = ϕ−1(a). But if he were to increase in ability, then
he would also move up in the ranking and be matched with a higher b. Moreover, whenever
someone moves up in the rankings, someone else must move down and experience a decrease
in productivity. The assignment model is needed to keep account of the changes that are
caused by the rearrangement of individuals, when distributions of ability or ﬁrm size change.
Interestingly it seems to have escaped the attention that the “diﬀerential rents” assignment
models (including our model) satisfy “the No-Surplus Condition” of Ostroy (1980, 1984)
which is an alternative deﬁnition for a perfectly competitive equilibrium. This means that
individuals actually do receive their marginal product, if the margin is deﬁned with respect
to individuals.
Wage is not in general equal to the marginal productivity of ability because changing
someone’s ability is not a true economic margin—ability can not conceivably be extracted
from one individual and poured into another. The true margin in a market with an assign-
ment problem is whether a given individual (or other factor unit) will participate in the
industry or not. By this deﬁnition, factors do indeed earn their marginal product as rents
over their outside opportunity. Equation (2.7) gives the decrease in total industry output,
taking into account the resulting reassignment of ﬁrms and other individuals, if individual i
were to leave the industry. In the absence of individual i, all ﬁrms in [0, i] would then have
17For example, according to Sattinger (1993, p. 848) “Because of the ﬁxed proportions technology, in
which one worker can only be used in combination with one machine, the marginal products of workers and
machines are not deﬁned.”
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to match with a marginally lower talent than before.
To see this explicitly, suppose that individuals in quantiles [i − ε, i] were to leave the
industry. What would be the resulting loss in output per individual? Individuals below the
quantile i− ε would move up and match with a ﬁrm that is ε quantiles higher ranked than
their previous match. The total change in output, divided by the mass of lost individuals,
is then
∆Y
ε
=
1
ε
∫ i
0
(Y (a[j − ε], b[j])− Y (a[j], b[j])) dj. (2.16)
The marginal product of a single individual is obtained by letting the mass of “disappearing”
individuals go to zero.18 This is mathematically the same derivation that was earlier used
to obtain the wage proﬁle (2.7). If a single individual is forced to quit the industry for
some reason, then the resulting social loss is the diﬀerence between his wage and his outside
income. This deﬁnition of marginal product could be used to derive the factor incomes in
an assignment model to begin with, given that the eﬃcient matching has ﬁrst been solved
for. There is also a distributional eﬀect—a pecuniary externality—from the disappearance
of individual i. It shifts the division of surplus to individuals’ favor.
One striking feature of this model industry is that factor owners are only aﬀected by
changes in the quality of those below them in the rankings. Mathematically this is obvious
from the fact that the equations for factor income proﬁles take the form of integrals over
the proﬁles below. Intuitively, the binding constraint on any factor owner is the quality
and price of their next best competitor. If the next best competing factor unit becomes
less competitive, then one can raise the price a little bit, and this price increase spills over
along the whole proﬁle above by shifting the division of surplus.
2.3 Applying the Assignment Model
When should the assignment model be used? The basic requirement is that there is a market
where some factors of production are embedded in discrete units, and where the units of one
factor could in principle match with any unit of another factor. If the observed matching
is consistent with assortative matching, then a particularly simple type of an assignment
18Whether the lowest ﬁrms in [0, ε] hire the best individuals outside the industry (with a negative quantile
[−ε, 0]), or exit the industry, won’t matter at the limit. Technically, the new level of output should be
max {w0 + π0, Y (a[j − ε], b[j])}, where the outside option will be higher for the very lowest pairs.
70
model can be applied. In the absence of assortative matching a more general assignment
model could still be relevant, though probably less instructive.19
The strong positive relation of CEO pay and (any deﬁnition of) ﬁrm size suggests
that something like assortative matching may be going on. The CEOs and companies are
matched one-for-one, so if scarce management ability tends to be more valuable in larger
ﬁrms and ﬁrm size diﬀerences are not purely explained by diﬀerences in managerial ability,
then the level of pay can not be expected to equal marginal productivity in the standard
sense. Yet, like any model, this assignment model captures only some aspects of reality.
The assumption of perfect sorting leaves out frictions and idiosyncratic characteristics of
individuals and ﬁrms, which are surely important in practice.
The properly deﬁned marginal product implicit in the pay level provides an answer to a
very simple counterfactual: what is the eﬀect of this one person on industry output. So one
could say that in a competitive market CEO pay levels only tell us what is their marginal
product, end of story. More interestingly, we can use factor income data to assess the eﬀects
of changing a whole distribution. The model makes it possible to run thought experiments
with changes in exogenous variables, and data can be used to bring actual numbers into
these experiments. However, doing this requires making some further assumptions. By
making a functional form assumption about the relation of ability and other variables, and
plugging in real data, we can get rough answers to several interesting quantitative questions.
While the rent accruing to a single individual is equal to the extra value that he brings
to the industry, the sum of the rents of all individuals understates the value that they
all add together. The pay and the marginal product of an individual are deﬁned holding
the characteristics of other all individuals as given; if more than one individual leaves
the industry, then the possibilities to counter some of this loss by reassigning the other
individuals are diminished, and total output is reduced even more.
If we ask what is the value of ability of all current managers in the economy, then we are
actually considering replacing the existing distribution of management ability with some
other distribution. Replacing the CEOs by no one at all is not a sensible counterfactual;
even if a company had no one by that title, someone would still have to make those decisions.
The distribution of abilities of the replacement CEOs should be somewhere below the
19The seminal assignment model of Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) considers a general problem for
matching plants and locations in a linear programming framework. See also Sattinger (1984).
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current lowest type manager. Since there is no way to estimate the relative abilities of out-of-
sample CEOs, I will use the lowest type sample CEO as the hypothetical replacement type.
The counterfactual from the title of the chapter, the diﬀerence that CEOs make, refers to the
social loss from replacing all CEOs in the largest 1000 ﬁrms by a type expected to be found at
the 1000th largest. In terms of the model, this diﬀerence is
∫ 1
0 (Y (a[i], b[i])− Y (a[0], b[i]))di.
On a more positive note, we can consider a change where all CEOs become as good as the
current highest ability CEO, i.e. we can use a[1] for all i as the counterfactual distribution.
A third simple counterfactual is random matching of CEOs and ﬁrms; in this case the
expected ability of managers would be equal to the current average ability at every ﬁrm.
The loss in total output that would be caused by a switch to random matching is the social
value of assortative matching among the top 1000 ﬁrms.
2.3.1 Inferring Factor Proﬁles
The assignment model shows how the distributions of factor qualities determine the equilib-
rium distributions of output and factor incomes. If the proﬁles of both factor incomes are
observed, then the model can be used reversely to infer the proﬁles of both factor qualities,
up to a constant. Estimation of Y (a, b) is pretty much out of the reach in the case of CEOs,
but we can proceed less ambitiously by assuming a plausible and often used functional form
and by using the observed factor incomes as the data. The distributions of factor quality
alone are meaningless—for reasons discussed before—but their diﬀerences together with
the production function will allow us to answer various counterfactuals about the eﬀects of
CEO ability on social surplus and the distribution of CEO pay.
The basic idea for inferring factor proﬁles comes from the observation that the slopes of
the equilibrium factor income proﬁles and the break-even level of output form a system of
two diﬀerential equations with a boundary condition.
w′[i] = Ya(a[i], b[i])a′[i]
π′[i] = Yb(a[i], b[i])b′[i]
w[0] + π[0] = Y (a[0], b[0])
i ∈ [0, 1] (2.17)
Using the observed factor income proﬁles w[i] and π[i], the proﬁles of factor qualities can
be solved from (2.17), up to constants of integration. In general, it includes a pair of
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nonlinear diﬀerential equations without a closed-form solution, so numerical methods may
be required. However, assuming a multiplicatively separable production function allows for
the proﬁles of a and b to be solved directly, up to multiplicative constants. These constants
conveniently wash out of the predicted economic eﬀects of hypothetical rearrangements or
changes in the qualities of individuals and ﬁrms.
The production function that will be used here allows for the level of adjustable capital
to depend on the ability of the CEO, as was discussed before in section 2.2.2. Restated at
its most general form, this production function is
Y (a, b) = max
k
{
cg(a)h(b)kθ − rk
}
, (2.18)
where c is a positive constant, and g and h are positive increasing functions, to be chosen
at convenience. This choice will of course aﬀect the scale of measurement for a and b, but
these are just nuisance parameters anyway. We are not interested in relations like w(a),
but in economic counterfactuals like Y (a[i], b[k]) − Y (a[j], b[k]), and these are invariant to
the choice of c,g and h.
The closed-form solution of (2.18) is a multiplicative production function, as seen before
in (2.11). The most convenient choice is to set c−1 =
(
θ
r
)θ
(1− θ) 11−θ , g(a) = a1−θ, and
h(b) = b1−θ. This choice yields the simple multiplicative production function Y (a, b) = ab,
as the solution of (2.18). The parameters θ and r can aﬀect the results through their eﬀect
on the interpretation of data. The elasticity of gross output to capital, θ, is the share of
adjustable capital in gross output. The division of a ﬁrm’s (shareholders’) income into a
rent to the ﬁxed factor b and a cost of adjustable capital is implicit in the assumed θ. It is
straightforward to do the calculations for diﬀerent assumptions of θ ∈ [0, 1); for any question
this gives two bounds for the economic eﬀects of CEO ability.20 Fortunately these bounds
don’t turn out to be too wide to be informative. On the other hand, questions about the
eﬀects of changes on the rent to b are not tenable, because these answers are completely
sensitive to the assumed value of θ.
With this simpliﬁcation, it is now easy to infer the distributions of relative levels of
20The share of adjustable capital θ cannot be arbitrarily close to one, because observed CEO pay is the
lower bound of the surplus for the ﬁxed factors. It is not sensible to assume a θ higher than the lowest
observed share of shareholder income in gross surplus, this share is about 0.96 in the data.
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factor quality from observed factor incomes. The system (2.17) becomes
w′[i] = a′[i]b[i]
π′[i] = a[i]b′[i]
w[0] + π[0] = a[0]b[0]
i ∈ [0, 1]. (2.19)
Dividing the slope of the pay proﬁle by the proﬁle of surplus, y[i] = w[i] + π[i], gives the
rate of increase of the ability proﬁle.
w′[i]
y[i]
=
a′[i]b[i]
a[i]b[i]
=
a′[i]
a[i]
. (2.20)
The other unobserved factor b cancels out, and relative abilities can be solved by integrating
the resulting equation. This leaves a multiplicative constant of integration, which is the
undetermined baseline ability level a[0].
a˜[i] ≡ a[i]
a[0]
= exp
{∫ i
0
w′[j]
y[j]
dj
}
(2.21)
The relative ability of two individuals, a[k]/a[j] = exp{∫ kj w′[j]y[j] dj}, gives the ratio of surplus
in any given ﬁrm in case it was matched with an individual ranked k or j respectively. The
other factor proﬁle, b˜[i] ≡ b[i]/b[0], can be recovered in the same way, again leaving an
undetermined multiplicative constant.
The most general type of a counterfactual we can answer is, how much diﬀerence does
it make to economic surplus at ﬁrm of quantile k if it were managed by an individual of
quantile i as opposed to quantile j?
Y (a[i], b[k])− Y (a[j], b[k]) = b[k] (a[i]− a[j]) = y[0]b˜[k] (a˜[i]− a˜[j]) . (2.22)
The last form can be calculated because it includes only the inferred relative factor qualities
and the observed baseline output. The counterfactuals discussed above can be constructed
from special cases of the form (2.22).
2.3.2 Data
The sample comprises the 1000 largest publicly traded US companies in the ExecuComp
database in 1999, provided by CompuStat. The variable for executive pay is taken from
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CompuStat, where the options are priced using the standard Black-Scholes formula. If ﬁrms
are risk neutral, then they are willing to pay in expectation the competitive price for an
individual’s expected ability. However, individuals value risky contingent pay substantially
below its cost, as is well known. The diﬀerence between the market cost of compensation
and its value to the CEO is a part of the cost of eﬀort (deﬁned in a broad sense) that could
be avoided in a perfect information world. Here this cost is subsumed under the level of
CEO pay.
It is crucial to distinguish between ﬁnancial and economic returns to CEO ability. While
a more able executive is expected to produce more economic surplus with given resources,
there can be no excess return to securities of companies that in equilibrium employ better
executives. The eﬀects of superior CEO ability must be included in the current market
value. If the current year CEO of ﬁrm i turned out to be worse than expected, say of
baseline ability, then Y (a[i], b[i])−Y (a[0], b[i]) would be the expected social loss to be borne
by the current shareholders, and possibly partly by the CEO himself through contingent
compensation. A CEO of expected ability is just expected to maintain the market value on
its expected path.
The output from a matched pair is the expected joint income, i.e. the combined income
of the CEO and the shareholders. In one year, this income, gross of the cost of adjustable
capital, is w+ rv, where w is the expected cost of CEO pay, v is market value, and r is the
expected rate of return. Shareholder income includes both the CEOs eﬀect on current proﬁts
and on discounted future proﬁts. Any income going to other parties, such as employees
and suppliers, has already been deducted at this point. After paying for the adjustable
capital, the surplus to be shared between the ﬁxed factors is (1− θ) (rv + w), which leaves
π = (1− θ) rv − θw as the factor income of b. This implies that b could be interpreted as
a type of unduplicatable (possibly intangible or sunk) capital kb, deﬁned as the “hidden
capital” from v − k∗ = kb, where k∗ is the optimal level of adjustable capital.
The prerequisite for the whole exercise to make sense is that CEO pay is increasing in
ﬁrm size. The relationship of CEO compensation and ranking by market value is shown in
Figure 2-3. It bears out the well known fact that larger companies pay more to their CEOs.
Sample correlations and descriptive statistics are listed in Tables 2.2 and 2.3. Market value
is the best explanatory variable for CEO pay in the data. The highest correlations of CEO
pay are with market value, 0.51 and 0.56 for logs and ranks respectively. The proﬁle of
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Figure 2-3: The relation of market value and CEO pay among the largest 1000 publicly traded US
companies in 1999. The pay proﬁle is not smoothed through the log function, so it appears upward
biased in the ﬁgure with log-scale.
market values is shown in Figure 2-4.
In reality, the magnitude of the potential economic impact of CEO ability in any given
ﬁrm depends on several factors, and can not be expected to be perfectly rank correlated
with market value. These other factors, as well as stochastic factors aﬀecting contingent
pay and the deviation of actual ability from what was expected at the time of matching,
are reﬂected in the variation of realized pay levels. To be used in the model, the observed
factor incomes must be ﬁtted over some common order i, in which both ﬁtted proﬁles are
strictly increasing. The order i should be chosen to maximize some criterion involving the
goodness-of-ﬁt of the ﬁtted proﬁles. The trade-oﬀ is that by choosing an ordering in which
the ordered data of one variable deviates less from its strictly increasing ﬁt, the deviations
in the ﬁt of other variables are likely to be increased. I use the order in market value,
because it is likely to be better measured. The pay that is recorded in a given year does
not necessarily compensate for the services in one calendar year, due to deferred pay and
bonuses.
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Figure 2-4: Largest U.S. ﬁrms by market value (thick line) and by asset value (thin line) in $ millions.
Variables Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
CEO Pay (m) 7.06 13.8 0 193.8
CEO Pay (a) 6.87 13.3 0 193.8
Market Value 12694 35489 613.8 508329
Assets 16062 52046 625.3 716937
Fitted CEO Pay (m) 6.93 5.14 2.12 21.0
Fitted CEO Pay (a) 6.78 3.86 2.77 16.0
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics. (m) refers to sample with 1000 largest ﬁrms by market value, (a)
by assets. The units are in $ millions.
In general, if we know that one variable is better measured than others, then it is better
to use the ordering in the better measured variable, because its ordering is likely to be
closer to the “true” ordering. Denote by w(i) the observed noisy values of w, when (i) is
the ranking of observations by observed π. Taking the average of w(j), for j close to i,
gives a better estimate for w[i] then doing the converse. Estimating π[j] from the ranking
in w would result in an average of observations that are not near to each other in the true
ranking, and the slope of the ﬁtted proﬁle of π would be seriously biased towards zero.
As much as π is also measured with error, or includes omitted variables, the estimated
wage proﬁle will be biased towards a ﬂat proﬁle, causing a downwards bias in the estimated
ability diﬀerences.
The ﬁtting could be done in many ways. The simplest way to smooth the proﬁles would
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logs
CEO Pay 1
Market Value 0.511 1
Assets 0.471 0.652 1
Sales 0.443 0.589 0.813 1
Employees 0.376 0.515 0.648 0.870 1
Fitted CEO Pay 0.508 0.974 0.645 0.569 0.498 1
Table 2.2: Sample correlations
ranks
CEO Pay 1
Market Value 0.559 1
Assets 0.473 0.645 1
Sales 0.492 0.608 0.810 1
Employees 0.424 0.499 0.628 0.862 1
Table 2.3: Sample rank correlations
be to divide the observations into a histogram, and interpolate a function through the bin
averages (and extrapolate at the edges). This is similar to what the kernel estimator does,
the main diﬀerence being that a kernel estimator creates a smooth nonlinear ﬁt.21 To put
it roughly, it takes a weighted moving average of CEO pay along the order by market value,
using higher weights for nearby observations. The ﬁtted pay proﬁle is shown as the dark
line in Figure 2-3. It begins at a baseline of $2.1 million, and reaches $21 million at the top
quantile.
While it is necessary to obtain increasing proﬁles for the factor incomes, continuity is
not essential. The model easily generalizes to a case with a discrete number of factor units.
The main diﬀerence of the discrete model is a match-speciﬁc rent, which adds to a more
complicated notation. Using either extreme assumption about the division of match-speciﬁc
rents has an eﬀect on the results that is within rounding error. The implied match-speciﬁc
rents caused by the ability-size complementarity are just too small to matter.
2.3.3 Results: The Value of CEO Ability
It was outlined in section 2.3.1 how the relative factor proﬁles can be inferred from observed
factor income proﬁles. The estimated proﬁle of relative abilities is graphed in Figure 2-5.
21The Epanechnikov kernel was used, with window width 150. When observations are ranked by market
value, the smallest window width which yields a strictly increasing ﬁt for the pay proﬁle is about 130; the
results are virtually the same with window width varying between 130 and 200. When observations are
ranked by the value of assets, then a bandwidth of 200 is needed for a strictly increasing ﬁt.
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Figure 2-5: The diﬀerence that CEOs would make if all matched with a same type of a ﬁrm. The
thick lines graph this diﬀerence, Y (a[i], b[0.5]) − Y (a[0], b[0.5]), evaluated at the median ﬁrm, for
θ ∈ {0, 0.967}. The thin line is the actual diﬀerence in pay levels w[i]− w[0]..
The question is, how much diﬀerence would management ability make, if all ﬁrms were
of the same type. The dollar value of the answer depends on the size of the ﬁrm that is
used as the point of evaluation. In the ﬁgure, the value of diﬀerences is evaluated at the
median ﬁrm. If all ﬁrms were similar to the current median ﬁrm, then the pay diﬀerence
between top and bottom CEOs would be about $10 million, compared to $19 million now.
If, instead, ability diﬀerences were evaluated at the baseline ﬁrm size, then the advantage
of the most able CEOs would be less than $2 million. These hypothetical diﬀerences in
pay still include the scale-of-operations eﬀect rising from the possibility to adjust the level
of capital according to the manager’s ability, but not the eﬀect from the complementarity
between ability and exogenous component of ﬁrm size.
Another way to evaluate the diﬀerences is to keep the distribution of ﬁrm types ﬁxed
at what it is, and see what is the value of current levels of ability compared to some
counterfactual. The dollar diﬀerence in economic surplus from replacing the existing CEOs
by some particular type are obtained by plugging in the inferred and counterfactual proﬁles
into equation (2.22) , and summing over i. Table 2.4 lists the results for the conceptually
possible values of θ (of which more in a moment). The ﬁrst row is the motivation for the
title of the chapter. It gives the total value of scarce ability of top 1000 CEOs, deﬁned as
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r = 0.10 θ = 0 θ = 0.5 θ = 0.75 θ = 0.9 θ = 0.95 θ = 0.967
Value of a− a[0] 36.9 36.3 35.2 32.3 28.1 24.8
Value of a[1]− a 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.8 4.1 4.5
Value of sorting 15.0 14.8 14.5 13.6 12.1 11.0
Value of b− b[0] 1212 605 302 120 59.2 39.6
Table 2.4: Results by assumed θ, in billions USD.
the diﬀerence that they make compared to the case where they were all replaced by lowest
type individuals in the sample, i.e. of the type managing the smallest sample ﬁrm. This
value is between $25 and $37 billion, depending on the assumed value of θ. For comparison,
the actual total pay of the CEOs is $7 billion, of which $5 billion is “extra” accruing to the
scarce ability. Since the baseline CEOs make about $2 million per year, the cost of pay for
all 1000 hypothetical replacement CEOs would be $2 billion.
The second row is the optimistic counterfactual: the change in total surplus, if all top
1000 CEOs became as good as the current highest ability individuals. In this case the
gains are much more modest than the losses in the previous grim scenario: the ﬁgure is
between 3.6 and 4.5 billion. The gains from increased ability are relatively small, because
the largest companies beneﬁt the least: their managers are already nearly top ability. In
this hypothetical case all CEOs would get paid only about $4 million, which is baseline pay
plus their excess value at the smallest ﬁrm. The increase in overall ability melts most of
the pay advantage of the better CEOs. In total, the CEOs earn $3 billion less under this
(socially) optimistic scenario.
The third line gives the diﬀerence in total output compared to a case where the matching
of individuals and ﬁrms is random. Under multiplicative separability, this is equivalent to
assuming that all CEOs are replaced by an individual of average type. The value of sorting
within the top 1000 ﬁrms and CEOs is estimated between $11-15 billion.
In the fourth scenario the individual types are held ﬁxed, but it is assumed that all ﬁrms
become the same type as the current smallest sample ﬁrm, which has a market value of $614
million. This is not a very useful counterfactual, because the result is totally sensitive to
the assumed value of θ.
The role of the parameter θ is best understood by considering how an otherwise similar
economy—with the same distributions of factor qualities—would diﬀer depending on the
value of θ. For higher values of this parameter, not only will levels of adjustable capital
be higher all around, but higher-ability individuals can increase their advantage more. The
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distributions of both factor incomes as well as capital levels are more skewed for higher
values of θ. To interpret the eﬀect of assumed θ on the empirical results, turn this idea
around. With observed pay levels and shareholder income ﬁxed, the inferred factor quality
distributions will have to vary with θ. The higher we assume θ to be, the larger is the role
of adjustable capital assumed to be in observed diﬀerences in market value and the smaller
are the required ability diﬀerences needed to explain the observed CEO pay diﬀerences.
After all, CEOs can only get paid extra for using capital and the ﬁrm’s unique position in
the economy to produce something that is worth more than the cost of that capital.
How could the optimal level of adjustable capital not depend on manager’s ability, i.e.
how could θ ever be zero? We could think of the production function as having the form
Y (a, b) = max
k≥0
{
amin {b, k} kθ − rk
}
. (2.23)
When capital is not binding in the Leontief part of the function, then this is exactly the
previously seen multiplicative two-factor production function with adjustable capital. How-
ever, as θ → 0, it will start to bind and k = b becomes optimal. In this case the gross
production function is y˜ = ab, but this is just another multiplicatively separable production
function. The point is that even for θ = 0, a large part of ﬁrm’s income could still be a
payment of adjustable capital, but the optimal level of that capital does not depend on the
ability of the manager, only on the type of the ﬁrm.
What happens as θ is near one? It can not sensibly be interpreted as being arbitrarily
close to one, because it is the share of adjustable capital in gross surplus (y = w+ rv), and
this can not be higher than the observed proportion of shareholder income in observed gross
surplus. It is conceivable that all ﬁrms could be inherently similar after all, i.e. have the
same b, but in this case all of the net surplus from the variation in capital levels across ﬁrms
would have to accrue to the CEOs. All diﬀerences in total shareholder income between
ﬁrms would just reﬂect the diﬀerence in the rental cost of adjustable capital. This would
require the ratio of CEO pay to shareholder income to be equal at ﬁrms of all sizes, namely
1−θ
θ , and CEO pay should be linear in market value. This is clearly not the case; the share
of CEO pay is decreasing in ﬁrm size. At assumed values of θ close to one, the model can
not sensibly interpret the data. The maximum sensible value of θ is the smallest observed
share of shareholder income, which is 0.967 in the sample.
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The dollar values are deﬁned in ﬂow terms, because the measured pay and shareholder
income are for a period of one year. To convert the value of ability to stock terms (literally),
these values must be multiplied by the inverse of the rate of return. This stock value of
CEO ability includes the discounted value added by all future CEOs. For example, in the
ﬁrst scenario, the stock value of ability is the drop in market value if it was suddenly found
out that all companies would have to match with a CEO of baseline ability from here to
eternity.
The eﬀect of assuming a diﬀerent expected rate of return is small within reasonable
limits for r. For example, assuming r = 0.05 halves the share of this period’s expected
shareholder income, and the eﬀect of this period’s CEO, in the market values. The relative
shareholder incomes between ﬁrms are not aﬀected by this, and the diﬀerence to relative
surpluses is also small because CEO pay is a very small proportion of gross surplus. A
replication of Table 2.4 would show that, for r = 0.05, the diﬀerence that CEOs make is
between $24.1 and $35.9; and for r = 0.15 it ranges from $24.6 to $37.2.22
2.3.4 What about Estimation and Testing?
Data requirements for doing away with the functional form assumption and actually esti-
mating the model are stringent. In the case of CEOs, it seems unreasonable that observables
like education and experience could capture a signiﬁcant part of what the market considers
a good manager. Movements of CEOs between ﬁrms are of no help in uncovering magni-
tudes of unobservable qualities, because in the model these movements should just reﬂect
changes in the ranking by expected ability.
Not only do the factor qualities have to be observable, but having any number of cross-
sections alone would be inadequate even if all variables were measured without error. Pos-
itive sorting forces factor incomes and factor qualities to be perfectly collinear, on some
increasing scale of measurement. In terms of Figure 2-2, all observations {a, b} would lay
on the matching graph. To estimate the factor income equations, we would need to ﬁnd
out the slopes of the isoquants in the region of equilibrium matching. But if we take the
model seriously, then all deviation from perfect linear correlation is due to noise, frictions,
and the chosen scales of measurement. To be able to identify the shapes of the isoquants,
we would need to observe cross-sections at diﬀerent points in time with suﬃcient variation
22The corresponding maximum sensible θs are 0.978 and 0.936 respectively.
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in the distributions of factor qualities.
The availability of data might be more favorable in some other application. Suppose that
we observed vectors of relevant unit-speciﬁc characteristics x and z. The simplifying power
of assortative matching relies on the assumption that there are one-dimensional suﬃcient
statistics a(x) and b(z), describing the relative quality of factor units. These should be
estimated as the ﬁrst step in estimating the production function. The goal would be to
ﬁnd functions a and b that maximize some criterion involving the rank correlations between
factor qualities and factor incomes. In other words, a (xi)>a(xj) should be a good predictor
that b (zi)>b(zj), wi > wj , and πi > πj . Note that functions a and b are not restricted to
be supermodular or even monotonic functions. Again, these functions are only deﬁned up
to a positive increasing transformation; the choice of transformation will be counteracted
by the estimated production function.
Having, against all odds, estimated the production function, we could test the model by
comparing the predicted factor income proﬁles with the actual. The model predicts a certain
way for the surplus (y[i]− y[0]) to be divided between factor owners. The actual division of
surplus into factor incomes is not used in the estimation of the production function, because
the left hand side variable is their sum y = w+π. The model could be deemed successful if
the predicted division of surplus into factor incomes, based on the observed factor qualities
and the estimated production function, was in suﬃcient agreement with the actual division.
2.4 Conclusion
It goes without saying that the above estimates must be taken with a grain of salt: they
don’t test the model, they are based on the assumption that it is true. However, the fact
that the observed relationship of ﬁrm size and CEO compensation is so strong gives hope
that this exercise could give some insight into the magnitudes of underlying CEO ability
diﬀerences and to the extent to which they can explain the observed diﬀerences in pay. The
total economic value of the scarce ability of the top 1000 CEOs is estimated at about $25-37
billion, depending on the assumed elasticity of output to capital. This is the diﬀerence they
make to total economic surplus, compared to the counterfactual where all of them were only
of the same ability level as the CEO of the smallest sample ﬁrm.
Since the economic diﬀerence that CEOs make is much larger than their total pay, most
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of the value of top talent apparently goes to the shareholders. In light of the assignment
model, this suggests that the diﬀerences in talent are a relatively small factor in determining
the observed ﬁrm size distribution, compared to exogenous or predetermined ﬁrm-speciﬁc
factors. All in all, the implied economic impact of diﬀerences in CEO ability seem quite
small compared to the diﬀerences in the market values of companies.
There is a time-honored tradition in economics to assume that prices are competitive
and reﬂect all available information, at least as the ﬁrst approach in analyzing market
data. In addition to giving a ballpark estimate for the diﬀerence that CEOs make, this
chapter has explored how assignment models can be used in this spirit to analyze data
from markets with positive assortative matching.23 For future applications that would
allow the assignment model to be tested, one would need to ﬁnd a matching market with
assortative matching, where the characteristics that determine the productivity of factor
units are directly observed and not contaminated by the characteristics of the matching
partner; furthermore the distribution of these characteristics would have to vary over time
suﬃciently for the production function to be estimated.
The next natural step in using the assignment model to analyze CEO pay would be
an inclusion of frictions (such as switching costs), incentive problems, and the structure of
pay.24 A more realistic model would take into account the complementarity of both inherent
ability and costly eﬀort with ﬁrm size.
23See Teulings (1995) for a more ambitious general equilibrium approach.
24Shimer (2001) introduces coordination frictions to an assignment model (due to mixed strategies in the
job application process); however this approach is probably not well applicable to the CEO market.
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Chapter 3
Transfer Fees and Development of
Talent
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the role of transfer fees in professional sports.
The motivation comes from the recent push to regulate, and possibly abolish, the transfer
fee system in European football (soccer). A transfer fee is basically the price of a player’s
remaining contract, which an acquiring club may have to pay to the current employer.
Like many economists (but unlike most pundits) who have discussed the system, I ﬁnd
that transfer fees serve an important allocational purpose. However, I believe the standard
defense that transfer fees provide compensation for the cost of training is insuﬃcient at best,
and seems to be pointing the way to detrimental ways of tempering the ongoing regulation.
The main point in this chapter is that transfer fees, far from being just scarcity rents to
talent or compensation for training, are needed to eﬃciently allocate job positions among
players of varying levels of talent and potential.
The labor market institutions in professional team sports are quite unusual.1 In Euro-
pean football, young players start as free agents but are able to make binding long-term
contracts. The length of these contracts as well as the salaries are negotiable. The con-
tracts eﬀectively prevent players from working for other football clubs while the contract is
in duration. This is where the transfer fees come from: before the end of the contract, a
1For a recent overview, see Rosen and Sanderson (2001).
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player cannot switch clubs without the consent of the current club, for which the new club
typically has to pay a transfer fee. About ﬁve out of six transfers results in a payment of a
transfer fee (Carmichael et al 1999). The buying club takes on the responsibilities of the old
contract, and the contracts are often extended at the time of a transfer with any changes
in terms subject to approval by the player. A strong complementarity between talent and
club size is a prominent feature of the industry: it makes sense for the best players to play
for the clubs with the most fans. As a result, the net ﬂow of talent is from the smaller clubs
and leagues to the bigger, and so the net ﬂow of transfer fees is to the opposite direction.
For example, in the 1998-99 season in the English Premier league transfer fee payments
were £269 million, of which £133 million was paid to foreign leagues and £13 million to
English Division One clubs.
The market for football players has recently attracted much attention in Europe in the
wake of soaring transfer fees.2 The transfer fee system is deemed by some to be in breach of
the European Union labor regulations guaranteeing workers the right to change employers.
The mere idea of trading in people is a cause for lot of indignation, as is well captured by
the statement of Viviane Reding, the EU’s Sports Commissioner: “I ﬁnd it scandalous that
players are being used as objects of speculation, bought and sold like commodities.”3 The
football industry has defended the transfer fees as necessary for compensating clubs that
lose talented players they discovered and developed. A quote from Rick Parry, the CEO of
Liverpool, sums up the main point of industry leaders: “My great concern is the impact of
these proposals on developing young players. How can you protect the investment over the
long term?”4 The international players’ union FIFPro has been muted in its comments,
possibly due to internal disagreements, and in any case has not been advocating an abolition
of transfer fees.
Regardless of any possible advantages of the transfer fee system, it has often been asked
why professional sports should be exempted from the usual restrictions of labor law. Why
can professional athletes commit to binding wage contracts that are not possible in other
industries? Historically the reason why clubs have been able to enforce the transfer fee
system probably comes from the special nature of sports industries: no ﬁrm can produce
2The current record fee of 67 million Euros was paid by Real Madrid for the French midﬁelder Zinedine
Zidane in 2001 for the remaining four years of his contract with Juventus. His salary is not public, but is
speculated to be about 4 million Euros per year (www.footballtransfers.info).
3Financial Times, August 31, 2000.
4Quoted in www.soccernet.com, September 6, 2000.
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output without the cooperation of other ﬁrms, making it easy to punish cheaters. In the U.S.
the exceptionality of sports is supported by several Supreme Court rulings (largely based
on dubious competitive parity arguments), but in Europe the situation is more precarious.
Some of the exceptionality was already removed with the so-called “Bosman ruling” of
the European Court of Justice in 1995, by which clubs could no longer require transfer
fees for players moving at the expiry of a contract. It is hard to see any crucial economic
role for this strange feature of the old transfer system, and despite some vocal concerns
from the industry at the time the only visible eﬀect of this change seems to have been a
lengthening of contracts.5 However, the Bosman case brought the transfer system under
the limelight and has started a process that may lead to more serious limitations on player
contracts that could make them practically non-tradeable. The only respite is coming from
the general understanding that clubs that train young players should be compensated when
their players are “poached” by richer clubs. In the opinion of the Bosman decision judge,
Advocate General Lenz, transfer fees should be limited by the actual cost of training, and
the fee should only be payable for the ﬁrst transfer from the club that trained the player.
Diﬀerent formulas have been suggested for pinning down “a fair price” for the training that
would replace market-determined transfer fees and presumably decrease their general level.
It is easy for economists to see a valuable role for transfer fees. Much of contract theory
studies the problems that stem from worker inability to credibly commit to keeping his
word. In this sense professional sports look like a positive anomaly, and in any case a very
interesting institutional arrangement. The defense of transfer fees has been based on the
need for clubs to recoup training costs. However, these seem to be quite small compared to
transfer fees.6 Furthermore, players’ market value can increase by orders of magnitude over
the course of a year or two, but the largest increases take place while players are already
playing professionally—not earlier while they train at youth academies or play for junior
teams.
In the model I assume that there is no training. This is an approximation of the idea that
the costs of training young players are only a small factor behind transfer fees. A change
in a player’s market value is due to his development as a player, which is a by-product of
5This quirk was only in eﬀect in some countries, notably in Belgium and France. The more substantive
part of the Bosman ruling prevented the discrimination of E.U. nationals in sports, which used to be common
in the form of maximum quotas for foreign players.
6In the view of Morris et al (2000, p. 257) the transfer fees are even “wholly unrelated to the actual
training and development costs incurred.”
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getting to play. I model this development as public learning about the talent of a player;
it could also be interpreted as learning-by-doing by the player if the player’s capacity to
beneﬁt from learning opportunities is deﬁned as the ex ante unknown level of talent. Here
not just talent but also the opportunities for learning are scarce. In football this scarcity
stems from the scarcity of actual playing time with able co-players and opponents at the
professional level, for which no amount of training can substitute. Here the scarcity is
for simplicity modeled as an exogenously scarce number of clubs (or viable markets for a
professional club).
Another crucial part of the model is the complementarity of player talent with job-
speciﬁc characteristics, which are for simplicity subsumed under a single characteristic,
referred to as “club size.” Due to the heterogeneity of clubs by size, the eﬃcient matching
of a cohort of players with clubs changes as players develop and new information becomes
available. The matching of clubs and players takes place in a competitive market, where the
prices of talent (whether transfer fees or salaries) determine the division of rents between
buyers and sellers of talent. Heterogeneity of clubs also means that scarcity rents are
possible, not just for talented players, but also for clubs that have higher-value use for
talent, i.e. “big” clubs. Besides aﬀecting eﬃciency, the nature of the transfer system can
aﬀect the division of these rents.
The model predicts that the abolition of transfer fees causes an increase in the price of
talent. In total, players gain less than clubs lose. Jobs are ineﬃciently reallocated towards
reduced experimentation: some positions that should be used to try out new players with
upside potential will instead be ﬁlled with older players with less potential, but with better
expected near-term performance. There is a decline in turnover (in and out of the industry)
and an increase in the average age and career length of players. Expected value of players’
lifetime incomes goes up, but the model does not lend itself to analysis of player welfare
because it does not account for risk aversion and thus ignores the insurance beneﬁt from
making long-term contracts. (In the model a credit constraint keeps young players from
paying to play).
The outline of the chapter is as follows. First the basic model is presented and the
determination and division of surplus is explained. The outcome of the market is analyzed
both with and without the possibility of long-term commitment to transferable contracts
by the individuals, with focus on the distribution of proﬁts and wages, and turnover. The
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eﬀects of non-tradeable ﬁrm-speciﬁc commitment with the duration set by the regulator,
and of ﬁxed transfer fees with the level set by the regulator, are also considered. The chapter
is concluded with a discussion of the results.
3.2 The Model
The starting point of the model is that the revenue generated by a player is increasing in
his talent and in the size of the home market of the club. The size of the market, or “ﬁrm
size” for short, is a ﬁxed characteristic stemming from factors like the size of the club’s
home city and its historically determined fan base. The other central feature is that the
level of talent can only be found out by actually playing in one of the scarce positions in
the industry. Players have ﬁnite careers, so some new talent must be hired every period, at
the very least to replace retiring players.
Assumptions
1. The revenue generated by a player is ab, where a is the talent of the player and b is
ﬁrm size.
2. Every period a unit measure of potential players are born, their talent drawn from a
distribution with the mean θ¯ and a continuous and strictly increasing CDF Fθ.
3. Player careers last up to two periods: the talent level of a novice is unknown, but
becomes public knowledge after one period in the industry.
4. Players cannot work for less than reservation wage w.
5. There is a unit measure of jobs in a continuum of risk neutral ﬁrms with an exogenous
size proﬁle b[i], which is continuous and strictly increasing at all i ∈ [0, 1]
6. θ¯b[0] ≥ w.
7. There is no discounting. Firms are inﬁnitely lived and maximize long-run average
proﬁts.
Assumption 1 deﬁnes the simplest possible complementary production technology. Of
any two players, the more talented one would generate more revenue at any club, but this
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diﬀerence is larger the bigger the club.7 The main consequence of this complementarity
is that the eﬃcient matching is positively assortative: the best players should play for the
biggest clubs.
Assumptions 2 and 3 describe the simplest possible information structure: at ﬁrst noth-
ing is known about the talent of novice players, and after one period of work their talent
is known exactly. All novice players have therefore the expected talent of the population
average θ. The ex ante homogeneity of potential players is not a crucial assumption, the
point is that information about talent is much more inaccurate for inexperienced players.
What is crucial is that important aspects of talent can only be reliably assessed in “real
jobs” within the industry.
Assumption 4 is a simpliﬁcation of the idea that young players are credit constrained (or
risk averse) and cannot pay for the opportunity to play. Assumption 5 ﬁxes the number of
ﬁrms and jobs exogenously. The important feature is that it is impossible for all potential
players to get to play and show their talent: there is a unit mass of jobs but a mass 2 (two
cohorts of unit mass) of potential players alive each period. The assumption of a continuum
of ﬁrms means that the market is competitive so that there is no room for bargaining or
strategic behavior. Assumption 6 guarantees that even the smallest ﬁrm would at least
break even if it had no other income besides revenue from the mean type. Assumption 7,
no discounting, is made to simplify the notation.
There is no asymmetric information or eﬀort cost and thus no moral hazard, adverse
selection or other incentive problems in the model. Neither are there any kinds of fric-
tions or ﬁrm-speciﬁc learning. Footballing talent is assumed to be general to the whole
industry, which leaves out potentially very complicated real-world complementarities and
substitutability between diﬀerent types of players within a club.
The assumption of two-period careers means that long-term commitment is necessarily
equated with career-long commitment, which is not observed in reality. In practice the
contracts are staggered over the career: players are typically ﬁrst traded while on initial
contract, at which point the new contract is extended beyond the duration of the original
contract. At this point, if the player is moving up, the wage is also typically revised upwards.
That all players start in the industry as equally promising is also a stark abstraction, but
7For a stylized multiplicative example, suppose b is the number of club’s potential supporters who come
from mutually exclusive populations (i.e. no consumer is a potential supporter for more than one club).
Talent a could then be deﬁned as the average revenue per potential supporter.
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again not crucial for the results. The model applies when there is signiﬁcant uncertainty:
when there are players who were expected to become stars but fade away and nobodies
who just marginally, perhaps through an injury of somebody else, get a chance to play and
become stars. This type of uncertainty is arguably very common in sports
In this study talent is deﬁned merely as the capacity to generate revenue, whether
through sales of tickets and merchandize, or television rights. Whether it is based on an
inborn ability to acquire athletic skills or on the level of internal motivation is immaterial
here. Also, revelation of talent is for practical purposes the same as learning-by-doing, if
talent is deﬁned as the initially unknown capability to beneﬁt from an opportunity to learn
on the job. The crucial factor is that the learning opportunities where stars are separated
from mediocrities are only available inside the industry.
It is a crucial assumption here that the audience values player talent for its pure en-
tertainment value on the quality of the game and not just for its eﬀect on winning. If, to
the contrary, audiences only cared about seeing their team win, then any investment into
level of talent would be socially wasteful. A model where revenue depends on the player’s
talent exclusively via its rank in the distribution of talent would result in excessive search
for talent, along the lines of Frank and Cook (1995).
The eﬀect of competitive parity on industry revenue is a related issue. Total industry
revenue could be lowered by having player talent too unevenly spread between the clubs,
because too uneven competition lessens the interest in the sport. This can weaken the
complementarity between player talent and club size, but cannot take it away. When there
is value for spreading the chance of winning a competition, it is still more eﬃcient to have
the larger clubs win more often.
Finally, in a somewhat non-standard fashion, it is assumed that ﬁrms are inherently
heterogeneous by how much revenue any given talent would generate there. What is the
non-duplicable exogenous component in club size that is the source of economic rents for
ﬁrms? There may be free entry into being a professional football club in Manchester, but
not into being Manchester United.8 Fan loyalty - a type of a very high switching cost - acts
as a source of rents for a club with a large fan base. An increase in ticket prices may cause
8The way to enter the professional football industry in Europe is to buy an amateur or semi-professional
low-tier club, and turn it into a fully professional clubs: a ﬁfth division club can in theory be promoted
to the top league within ﬁve seasons. This mechanism allows for the regional reallocation of major league
clubs, which in the U.S. is achieved by moving the franchises.
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die-hard fans to stay home more often and just read the newspaper report, but is less likely
to turn them into supporters of a cheaper club. A club name with a glorious history and
with a home in a large city is a unique asset that can earn rents. These rents should be
expected to discounted in the stock price, and perhaps dissipated back when it was decided
what club gets to occupy that niche, but that is inconsequential for the contemporaneous
division of rents between clubs and players.
The Supply of Talent The distribution of talent in the population is ﬁxed, but the
distribution of talent in the workforce depends on how many novices were hired in the
previous period. In steady state some proportion i∗ of jobs are ﬁlled with novices and the
remaining 1 − i∗ jobs are ﬁlled with veterans, who were novices last period. Each feasible
proportion of novices
(
i∗ ≥ 12
)
corresponds to a diﬀerent threshold level of talent θ∗ (which
could also be used as the equilibrating variable). Players who turn out to be above the
threshold θ∗ “make the grade” and get to stay in the industry as veterans, while those
below exit after one period. The threshold can not be below the population mean θ¯ in
equilibrium because there are always more novices available, who are of the expected type
θ¯ and willing to work at the lowest possible wage.
In what follows, the distributions are described in terms of their inverse distribution
functions, or “proﬁles” for short. The proﬁle of talent in the population of potential players,
and therefore in any cohort of novices, is denoted by θ[i], and the proﬁle of expected talent in
the industry by a[i|i∗]. In θ[i], i refers to the quantile in the cohort, of whom an endogenous
measure i∗ gets hired as novices, whereas in a[i|i∗] it refers to the quantile within the
workforce, which was normalized to be of measure one (by there being a measure one of
jobs).
The lowest i∗ types in the industry by expected talent are the novices, who are in
expectation of the average type θ. Since there is a measure 1− i∗ of veterans who are the
best of the last period’s cohort of novices they must be a proportion 1−i
∗
i∗ of that cohort. The
threshold type must therefore be the
(
1− 1−i∗i∗
)
th quantile of the population distribution,
giving the relation of the thresholds as9
θ∗(i∗) = θ[2− 1
i∗
]. (3.2)
9Another way to derive this relation is to start by noting that the proportion of novices that get to stay
on as veterans is 1−Fθ (θ∗). In steady state the measure of veterans must be equal to the measure of novices
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The talent proﬁle of the veterans comes from the truncated distribution above θ∗. The
combination of these is the proﬁle of expected talent in the industry.
a[i|i∗] =


θ i ∈ [0, i∗]
θ[1− 1−ii∗ ] i ∈ (i∗, 1]
(3.3)
Note that the players in [0, i∗] are actually a random draw from the whole distribution, but
since their talent is unknown and ﬁrms are risk neutral they can be treated as the mean
type θ.
The Division of Rents The ﬁrst question in the model is how the rents are divided
between the clubs and the players. This section derives the prices of talent for a given
distribution of talent and ﬁrm size. The prices are determined in a competitive market where
buyers (ﬁrms) and sellers of talent (ﬁrms or players) meet under symmetric information. All
but possibly the least productive match will produce a rent over the sum of their outside
opportunities, and the equilibrium prices pin down the division of this rent into “factor
incomes” for the owners of talent and ﬁrms. The price of talent can consist of a wage, a
transfer fee or both, depending on who owns the (contractual rights to) talent.
Due to the complementarity in production, the eﬃcient matching of individuals and
ﬁrms is simple: the largest ﬁrm hires the highest available talent, the second largest hires
the next highest talent and so on. Equilibrium prices must be consistent with this eﬃcient
matching. The assumptions of a continuum of players and continuous distributions of talent
and ﬁrm size guarantee that they are also unique, i.e. there will be no match-speciﬁc rents
left for bargaining. With these assumptions the setup is essentially the same as that in the
assignment model of Sattinger (1979).10
The proﬁles of talent and ﬁrm size are denoted by a[i] and b[i] respectively, where i
is the quantile i ∈ [0, 1]. (Here the proportion of novices i∗ is treated as a constant and
suppressed from the notation.) The equilibrium price for talent a[i] is denoted by p[i], it
is paid by ﬁrm i to the owner of talent a[i] and does not include the reservation wage w,
who turn out to be above the threshold:
1− i∗ = i∗(1− Fθ (θ∗))
=⇒ i∗(θ∗) = 1/ (2− Fθ (θ∗)) , (3.1)
which is the inverse of (3.2).
10For a survey of assignment models see Sattinger (1993).
93
which must be paid to all players regardless of who gets the rents from their talent. The
condition for all ﬁrms to want to stick to their own match is
a[i]b[i]− p[i] ≥ a[j]b[i]− p[j] ∀i, j ∈ [0, 1]. (3.4)
Furthermore, the ﬁrms have to at least break even and the sellers must get a nonnegative
price.
a[i]b[i]− p[i]− w ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [0, 1] (3.5)
p[i] ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ [0, 1] (3.6)
Inequalities (3.4) and (3.5) are mathematically analogous to incentive compatibility and
participation constraints in a nonlinear pricing problem with quasi-linear utility functions
and “types” b[i]. The prices that simultaneously fulﬁll the above criteria for all buyers and
sellers can be found using the constraint reduction method familiar from nonlinear pricing
problems. The binding constraints are those that prevent ﬁrms from wanting to hire the
next lowest talent. These binding constraints deﬁne the slope of the price proﬁle.11
p′[i] = a′[i]b[i] (3.8)
Finally, by integrating the slope of the price proﬁle, we get the equilibrium prices for
talent.
p[i] =
∫ i
0
a′[j]b[j]dj, i ∈ [0, 1]. (3.9)
The intercept p[0] = 0 results from the assumption that there are more potential players
than there are jobs, so the lowest type hired cannot get any rent.12 Thus ﬁrms capture all of
the rent at the bottom, π[0] = a[0]b[0]−w. The buyer’s share of the rents is easily recovered
from equation (3.9) as the leftover π[i] = a[i]b[i] − p[i] − w = π[0] + ∫ i0 a[j]b′[j]dj. Firms
11Regrouping the IC constraint (3.4) for j = i− ε and dividing it by ε gives
p[i]− p[i− ε]
ε
≤ (a[i]b[i]− a[i− ε]) b[i]
ε
. (3.7)
This holds as an equality as ε → 0 and, via the deﬁnition of the derivative, yields the slope of the price
proﬁle.
12We could think of the proﬁle of available talent starting at some negative i.
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are not residual claimants however, the equilibrium could equally well have been deﬁned
starting from sellers’ constraints.
The level and dispersion of rents to talent depend on the dispersion of talent levels and
ﬁrm size. If ﬁrms were homogeneous, so that b[i] ≡ b¯ > 0, then rents to talent would simply
be Ricardian rents: p[i] = (a[i]− a[0]) b¯. In any case, for any level of talent, the rents are
increasing in the advantage over the marginal talent and in the level of the complementary
factor. When ﬁrms are heterogeneous then the division of rents at any quantile i depends
on the whole distributions of talent and ﬁrm size below. The price of a talent of level a[i]
in (3.9) is a weighted sum of the “increments” in talent between a[i] and a[0], where the
weights are the sizes of the ﬁrms matched at each increment. The share of talent of the rent
created at ﬁrm i, i.e. of a[i]b[i]−w, is therefore higher when the talent levels of competitors
below are closer to a[0], because then the high values of a′ are weighted by higher b[i]s.
It is also higher when the competing buyers are as close as possible to b[i] in size, so that
the weights are everywhere as high as possible. As is intuitive, it is best to have one’s own
competitors to be of low productivity, and to have one’s equilibrium match have to compete
with many close substitutes.
The prices of talent constitute an equilibrium in a market where both buyers and sellers
can make oﬀers. In equilibrium no ﬁrm can lower its oﬀer to its eﬃcient match without
losing that talent to another ﬁrm and no ﬁrm would like to hire another ﬁrm’s match at
their equilibrium price. Neither buyers nor sellers can gain by making any other oﬀers to
anyone else besides the equilibrium oﬀer to their eﬃcient match.
In this continuous model there is nothing to be bargained over: every buyer’s and
every seller’s opportunity cost inside the market is exactly binding. In a discrete model
there would be a relationship-speciﬁc rent bounded by the threat values of matching with
the next lowest counterpart. For thin-tailed distributions of talent and/or ﬁrm size this
bargaining residual could be substantial at the highest level, but less so for more ordinary
individuals and ﬁrms for whom the market is more “liquid” in the sense of there being very
similar alternative matches and competitors in the market.
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3.3 Equilibrium with Transfer Fees
When individuals can commit to transferable long-term contracts, then novices agree to
do so at their reservation wage. They cannot do any better since individuals of unknown
talent are not scarce. When a club discovers a high talent it can sell his remaining contract
and get the full talent rent as the transfer fee. Since novices are the least talented players
by expectation to work in the industry it is the small clubs that employ them, while the
big clubs buy their talent from the small clubs. In equilibrium, the threshold ﬁrm i∗ must
be indiﬀerent between hiring a novice and getting the expected transfer fee, and between
hiring the threshold talent θ∗(i∗) for a zero transfer fee. The threshold talent is transferred
at a zero fee, because it is also the highest talent to be discarded from the industry. The
transfer fees are the prices of talent as determined as in section 3.2, but with the proﬁle of
talent a[i|i∗] now dependent on the endogenous proportion of novices.
Since the smallest i∗ ﬁrms hire novices they don’t pay any transfer fees. In terms of
the price equation (3.9), the proﬁle of expected talent is ﬂat for the novice-hiring ﬁrms:
a′[j|i∗] = 0 for j ∈ [0, i∗). Given i∗, the transfer fee paid by ﬁrm i > i∗ for its match, a
talent of level a[i|i∗], is
p[i|i∗] =
∫ i
i∗
a′[j|i∗]b[j]dj. (3.10)
(And zero for i < i∗). Total transfer fees in the industry are
P [i∗] =
∫ 1
i∗
p[i|i∗]di =
∫ 1
i∗
∫ i
i∗
a′[j|i∗]b[j]djdi =
∫ 1
i∗
(1− i) a′[i|i∗]b[i]di, (3.11)
where the last step involves a partial integration. Since all novice-hiring ﬁrms draw their
talent from the same distribution they all get the same expected share of these total rents
in expectation, namely 1i∗P [i
∗]. They also get the revenue generated by a novice, who is of
the expected type θ. The long-run average proﬁts of a novice-hiring ﬁrm i are
π0[i|i∗] = θb[i] + 1
i∗
P [i∗]− w. (3.12)
Firms that hire veterans get the revenue from their match while paying the corresponding
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transfer fee.
π1[i|i∗] = a[i|i∗]b[i]− p[i|i∗]− w, i ≥ i∗. (3.13)
Either way, the ﬁrms must always pay the current employee w to get him to actually work,
regardless of his experience or talent level.
The threshold ﬁrm must be indiﬀerent between employing novices or veterans so the
equilibrium i∗ is deﬁned by π0[i∗|i∗] = π1[i∗|i∗]. Rearranging this equilibrium condition we
get
(
θ∗(i∗)− θ) b[i∗] = 1
i∗
P [i∗], (3.14)
where a[i∗|i∗] = θ∗(i∗) and p[i∗|i∗] = 0 were used. On the left is the opportunity cost
of hiring a novice: it is the lost revenue from hiring a novice as opposed to the threshold
talent (who would be available at zero transfer fee). On the right is the beneﬁt, the expected
transfer fee earned by hiring a novice. Note that the equilibrium rehiring threshold is strictly
above the population average: small clubs sacriﬁce some current revenue in exchange for
expected transfer fees in the future.13 The equilibrium is unique because the left side is
strictly increasing in i∗ and changes sign at an intermediate value, whereas the right side is
positive, strictly decreasing, and reaches zero at i∗ = 1. Higher i∗ means that more ﬁrms
are trying to sell talent to fewer buyers, so it is intuitive that the expected price goes down.
To verify that the equilibrium is eﬃcient, ﬁrst note that the opportunity cost of a unit
measure of players and ﬁrms is ﬁxed, so total surplus only depends on i∗ via its eﬀect on
the distribution of talent in the industry. Total surplus in the industry is a function of the
proportion of novices i∗
Y (i∗) = θ
∫ i∗
0
b[i]di+
∫ 1
i∗
a[i|i∗]b[i]di− w. (3.15)
The ﬁrst order condition is
Y ′ (i∗) = θb[i∗]− a[i∗|i∗]b[i∗] +
∫ 1
i∗
∂a[i|i∗]
∂i∗
b[i]di = 0 (3.16)
=
(
θ − θ∗ (i∗)) b[i∗] +
∫ 1
i∗
∂a[i|i∗]
∂i∗
b[i]di = 0. (3.17)
13With discounting, the right side would be multiplied by the discount factor.
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Expanding the integrand by using (3.3) and taking the derivative yields
∂a[i|i∗]
∂i∗
=
∂
∂i∗
θ[
i+ i∗ − 1
i∗
] =
1− i
i∗2
θ′[
i+ i∗ − 1
i∗
] =
1− i
i∗
a′[i|i∗]. (3.18)
Plugging this back into (3.17) we see that the integral is equal to P [i
∗]
i∗ , so the ﬁrst-order
condition of the total surplus maximization problem is the same as the market equilib-
rium condition under transfer fees. Of course, this is just what must result from perfect
competition and lack of externalities.
Transfer fees would not be needed for eﬃciency if novices could pay to play. Risk neutral
novices with unconstrained credit would be willing to pay for the opportunity to play up
to the expected value of second period talent rents. In equilibrium the novice wage would
then be
w∗ = w − P [i
∗]
i∗
= w − (θ∗(i∗)− θ) b[i∗]. (3.19)
The novices would in eﬀect buy out older players of below θ∗(i∗) talent, which could be very
costly if the diﬀerence between mean talent and threshold talent is worth a lot of money at
the threshold club. The veteran wage would be w + p[i|i∗], and this payoﬀ could be very
risky. For skewed distributions of talent and ﬁrm size most of the expected rents come from
a small chance of being a superstar, so even moderately risk averse novices with access to
unconstrained credit might be willing to pay only a small fraction of the expected rents.
3.4 Equilibrium without Transfer Fees
There can be no transfer fees if it is not possible for individuals to commit to transferable
long-term contracts. Without long-term commitment talented players can be “raided” by
another club that oﬀers a higher wage. Due to the complementarity in production, it is
eﬃcient that the best players should move up and pay with the biggest clubs, but now the
clubs that “discovered” them will get no compensation. As before, players that turn out to
be below average will not be rehired because novices are abundant and more talented by
expectation. The problem is that now all players that turn out to be above the population
average, no matter by how little, will be hired by some club.
At the level of the whole industry the basic trade-oﬀ is how to allocate the scarce playing
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opportunities between novices and veterans. Hiring more novices allows for a larger supply
of talented veterans but leaves fewer positions for them to use that talent. Without transfer
fees this trade-oﬀ does not factor into clubs’ hiring decision. When clubs base their hiring
decisions only based on the expected revenue at the hiring club they ignore the upside
potential of younger players and the higher value of talent at bigger clubs. The upside
potential is now inevitably captured by players themselves.
In the absence of transfer fees the novice-hiring clubs only get revenue from output.
The right side of the equilibrium condition (3.14) is therefore replaced by zero, so that
θ∗
(
i0
)
= θ¯ is the only solution. Since a larger fraction of novices get to stay in the industry
as veterans, the proportion of jobs held by novices is now smaller: i0 < i∗.14 That fewer
clubs hire novices should be intuitive since it is made less proﬁtable by the elimination of
transfer fees. A section of medium-productivity jobs, [i0, i∗], will be ﬁlled with veterans
θ ∈ [θ¯, θ∗ (i∗)] instead of novices. These “mediocre” types are more talented than novices
by expectation, but would not be employed under the transfer fee system. Notice that the
solution i0 is independent of the ﬁrm size proﬁle b[i], reﬂecting the fact that the gains from
trade between clubs are not taken into account.
3.5 The Abolition of Transfer Fees
Before listing the predicted eﬀects of the abolition of transfer fees, let’s note one change
that does not happen even though it might seem intuitive at ﬁrst. Even though there is
reduced discovery of talent, it is not the case that the distribution of talent in the industry
would simply become worse (e.g. in the sense of stochastic dominance). With a reduced
proportion of jobs set aside for novices, fewer high talents are indeed discovered. However,
there are also fewer low types because novices are (on average) the lowest types to play.
Thus there must be are more middle types, i.e. “mediocre” players who are better than
(population) average θ¯ but not good enough to have been retained before. Figure 3-1 shows
the proﬁle of talent in the industry with and without transfer fees, depicted by dashed and
solid lines respectively. The corresponding proﬁle of clubs size is ﬁxed and not shown in
the ﬁgure.
So what does the model tell us about the eﬀects of abolishing transfer fees? There are
14The proportion of novices is now i0 ≡ i∗(θ) = 1/(2− Fθ(θ)), see the footnote on page 92.
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Figure 3-1: The proﬁle of (expected) talent in the industry, with and without transfer fees, depicted
by dashed and solid line respectively.
three main implications that are robust to the stark simplifying assumptions of the model.
1. The price of talent is increased for each level of talent θ > θ¯.
Consider the price of talent before and after the abolition of transfer fees, denoted by
p∗(θ) and p(θ). First, notice that p(θ) > p∗(θ) = 0 for θ ∈ (θ¯, θ∗ (i∗)], since these types were
discarded and available at zero fee under the transfer fee system, but have a positive price
afterwards (since they are above the new threshold type). Second, each level of talent above
the old threshold, θ > θ∗ (i∗), is now matched with a bigger club than they would have been
matched with under the transfer fee system; this is just the ﬂip-side of the fact that each
club above i∗ is now matching with a lower talent than before. Third, the derivative of
the price function p(θ) at any θ
′
> θ∗ (i∗) is equal to the size of the club matched with θ
′
.
This can be seen by changing the variable of integration from i to θ in (3.9) . Therefore
p(θ
′
)− p(θ′′) > p∗(θ′)− p∗(θ′′) for any θ′ > θ′′ ≥ θ∗ (i∗). The increase in the price of talent
caused by the abolition of transfer fees is in fact higher for higher talent, so the biggest
increase of all goes to the very highest type.
2. All clubs get lower proﬁts.
This is obvious for clubs that hire novices before and after, for them the only change
is the loss of transfer fees. Clubs that hire veterans before and after, each of them (except
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i = 1) now has to match with a lower talent than before, whom they could have hired before
at a lower price than now but didn’t. Finally, the switching clubs in the middle now get
more revenue from output than before, since they employ above-average types instead of
novices, but they also lose the transfer fees. The loss must be larger than the gain, since the
types that they hire are below the old threshold θ∗ (i∗) type who would have been available
at zero fee before.
3. Player careers become longer.
The exit rate of novices is lowered simply because the level of talent required to stay in
the industry as a veteran is lowered. Thus, even though fewer players ever get the chance
to enter the industry, a higher proportion of those who do get to stay for the long term.
Of course, an increase in the average age of players is also immediate from the increased
proportion of veterans.
To sum up, the elimination of transfer fees would result in fewer young players and
highly talented old players and more old mediocre players getting scarce playing time in
professional leagues. All clubs are worse oﬀ as a result, while salaries of older players
increase. Since equilibrium with transfer fees maximizes total surplus, this means that the
players gain less than the owners lose. The most clear-cut observable predicted change
would be the upward shift in the age distribution of players.
3.6 Other Regulations
The main motivation of the opponents of the transfer fee system seems to be a visceral
revulsion to what is viewed as a trade in human beings. While there is widespread under-
standing that clubs need to be compensated for nurturing young talent, this is not seen
as justifying the multimillion Euro fees observed at the top of the market. However, this
understanding has lead to suggestions to temper the reform in ways that would still reward
investment into young talent while removing the outright trade in players, or at least cutting
down the current fee levels.
In this section I will analyze two such modiﬁcations. The ﬁrst is ﬁrm-speciﬁc commit-
ment, i.e. non-tradeable contracts. The idea is that clubs that discover talent can keep
them for some amount of time at the original contractual wage, but they cannot sell them
to other clubs. At the end of the contract the players become free agents and can move
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to whichever club oﬀers the highest wage. This system gives some rewards to clubs that
develop talent while eliminating the hated transfer fees. I will show that it could actually
be worse for eﬃciency than an outright abolition of the transfer fee system. The other
proposal is a ﬁxed transfer fee. There the idea is that the regulator sets what is deemed
a single reasonable level of compensation for all transfers. In practice this might include
some formula that takes into account a player’s age and the number of games played both
for the club of origin and the acquiring club. I will show that if combined with a mandatory
turnover rule then a correctly chosen ﬁxed fee could in principle replicate the eﬃcient allo-
cation of the unregulated transfer fee system, with only redistributive eﬀects to the favor
of the (best) players.
It is assumed throughout that any restriction on transfer fees cannot be bypassed, for
example by masking the fees as termination penalties. The transfer fee system could in
fact be exactly replicated by renaming the fees as termination penalties. These would
be set at least as high as the market price of highest talent under the transfer fee system.
After the revelation of talent, the novice-hiring club would oﬀer a discount on the maximum
penalty, and in equilibrium the penalty actually paid would equal the market price of talent.
Termination penalties might be rhetorically acceptable to some opponents of the current
system, as individuals are not transparently being “bought and sold like commodities” but
just ﬁned on their broken promises. However, in case they were allowed after the abolition
of transfer fees it would probably become quite soon obvious to everyone that the penalties
are just transfer fees under a diﬀerent name.
Firm-speciﬁc Commitment
Under ﬁrm-speciﬁc commitment players can commit to work at the same club but the
contract cannot be traded to other clubs. If this commitment lasted the whole career than
the system would be a virtual hiring autarky, however the regulator may want to limit the
length of commitment time to less than the whole career. Limited ﬁrm-speciﬁc commitment
eliminates transfer fees and allows for some reward to clubs that discover talent. The reward
for the novice-hiring clubs is that they get to keep any talent they ﬁnd for a limited amount
of time at the original contract wage. At the end of the limited commitment period players
become free agents, and move to the club that oﬀers the highest wage. Free agents are
therefore always eﬃciently matched with the biggest clubs, who get a steady supply of
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proven high talent without needing to give high-productivity playing time to novices.
To facilitate comparison with the other cases, keep assuming a (maximum) career length
of two periods, where it takes one period to for the level of talent to be revealed. Then
suppose that periods are divisible and use τ to denote the fraction of players’ second period
after which they become free agents. The duration of commitment (1 + τ) is chosen by the
regulator and clubs take it as a given parameter in their proﬁt-maximization problem.
The long-run average proﬁts of a novice-hiring club i are π[i] = A(θ∗|τ)b[i]− w, where
A(θ∗|τ) is the long-run average level of talent employed. To maximize proﬁts, novice-hiring
clubs choose the retaining threshold to maximize the average level of talent at the club.
To see what this average is, ﬁrst note that by using a retaining threshold θ∗ a club will be
hiring novices a fraction
φ(θ∗|τ) = 1
1 + τ(1− Fθ(θ∗)) (3.20)
of time, and retaining above-θ∗ types the rest.15 The long-run average level of talent at
novice-hiring clubs is then
A(θ∗|τ) = φ(θ∗|τ)θ¯ + (1− φ(θ∗|τ)) E[θ|θ > θ∗]. (3.22)
The ﬁrst order condition is
θ∗ − θ¯ = τ (1− Fθ(θ∗)) (E[θ|θ > θ∗]− θ∗) . (3.23)
The maximizer is necessarily the ﬁxed point of this function A(·|τ), denoted by A∗(τ). In
other words, at the maximum, a club’s retaining threshold is equal to the average talent of
its employees over time. The intuition for this result is that when the maximal average level
of talent employed is A∗, then discarding a talent above A∗ would have to decrease that
average as would retaining a talent below A∗, meaning that A∗ must be the maximizing
threshold.
15To solve for φ, ﬁrst suppose that retainment also lasted for a full period. Then the equilibrium probability
p that a club employing a novice at any given period must satisfy
pFθ(θ
∗) + (1− p)1 = p (3.21)
because not employing a novice this period means that next period the club will employ a novice for sure.
This results in p = 1/(2 − Fθ(θ∗)). Since retaining periods only last a fraction τ of novice periods, the
proportion of time spent retaining is φ = p
p+τ(1−p) , which results in (3.20).
103
The ﬁrst-order condition (3.23) describes well the nature of the “investment” problem:
by hiring a novice instead of a known type θ∗ a club reduces its immediate talent by θ∗− θ¯,
but makes the expected gain described by the right side. A longer commitment time will
make it more worthwhile to hire novices, increasing the threshold cum average: A∗′(τ) > 0.
For τ = 0 this is just the case without any commitment, so A∗(0) = θ¯. With τ = 1 this
becomes the case of full ﬁrm-speciﬁc commitment, where all ﬁrms would operate in hiring
autarky. The resulting average A∗(1) is the maximum feasible average level of talent in the
whole industry.
Compared to a simple abolition of transfer fees, which is equivalent to setting τ = 0, this
system has the beneﬁt that it gives some incentives to ﬁre mediocre players so there will be
more experimentation with new players. The trade-oﬀ from increasing the commitment τ
is illustrated in 3-2, where the dashed line shows a proﬁle of talent in the industry for an
intermediate value of τ . The clubs that hired novices under τ = 0 gain because the average
talent of their player goes up. Longer retainment makes it more attractive to hire novices,
so more clubs start doing it. The downside is that a smaller fraction of the high-talent
players are available for the biggest clubs to hire at any time, so they will have to match
with a lower type than before: after an increase in τ there is a better supply of talent in
the industry, but the matching less eﬃcient. The biggest clubs compete for the free agents,
who will receive the market price of talent as wages. Whether total surplus is increased
or decreased would depend on the distribution of ﬁrm size. Roughly, if the distribution
are very concentrated (i.e. if the proﬁle b[i] is quite ﬂat) then the eﬀect of the increase
in average talent is more useful, but if the gains from eﬃcient over random matching are
very large (e.g. when the largest ﬁrms are very large compared to the others) then the loss
from ineﬃcient matching is more important. It could therefore be best to simply end all
long-term commitment.
On the other hand, career-long commitment (τ = 1) would only be optimal if all ﬁrms
were identical. To see this, consider starting from τ = 1 and decreasing τ a little bit. This
would discontinuously increase the talent available to the largest ﬁrm b[1] from A∗(1) to θ[1],
while lowering the average talent at all other ﬁrms only slightly. If b[1] is strictly larger than
the average ﬁrm in i = [0, 1) then this will increase the total surplus Y =
∫ 1
0 a[i]b[i]di− w.
To summarize, when transfer fees are not allowed and the regulator can set the length
of non-tradeable contracts, then the optimal commitment time is decreasing in the hetero-
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Figure 3-2: Proﬁle of (expected) talent in the industry, for τ ∈ {0, 0.5, 1}.
geneity of the ﬁrms by size. A zero commitment time may be optimal, but full commitment
is only optimal if all ﬁrms are identical.
Fixed Transfer Fees
Following the opinion of Advocate General Lenz, some regulation proposals have called for a
ﬁxed industry-wide transfer fee, which would presumably reﬂect some generally acceptable
level of compensation. The motivation for a ﬁxed transfer fee is apparently to end “the
speculation in players” while still providing clubs with some incentive to invest into young
talent.
A ﬁxed transfer fee can be implemented when the regulator can observe payments and
movements of players between clubs. It is not necessary to observe talent levels or payments
between clubs and players (which would be harder because they could be nonmonetary).
Fixed fees do not disturb the eﬃcient matching of those individuals who are actually traded:
clubs would be indiﬀerent between who buys their players, but it seems plausible that players
would be sold to whoever oﬀers the highest wage for them, i.e. their eﬃcient match.
One might think that the problem with a ﬁxed fee is that some eﬃcient trades are
prevented when the gains from trade are less than the ﬁxed fee. In these cases it would be
in the interest of selling clubs to give discounts when their player is not good enough to
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be bought at the ﬁxed fee. However, if the fee could be rigged downwards in this matter,
then an eﬃcient solution would not be possible. This may be counter-intuitive, but the
reason is that the problem with the complete abolition of transfer fees is not that eﬃcient
trading of available talent would be prevented but rather that too many mediocre talents
are retained, causing the distribution of available talent to be suboptimal. A ﬁxed fee can
work as a “retainment tax” which is used to subsidize clubs that hire novices. In this sense
discounts would amount to a distortinary tax dodge, allowing mediocre talents to stay in
the industry.
For a ﬁxed transfer fee to achieve the eﬃcient solution it is required that clubs are never
allowed to retain their own novices. After all, selling clubs can also use talent in-house and
might not want to sell the player if the price is too low. Such retaining could be prevented
with a mandatory turnover rule stating that players who stay in the industry after their
novice period must either switch clubs or exit the industry.
Suppose that players must either be sold or discarded after one period, and that the
ﬁxed fee is set at some level p¯ that results in a fraction i∗ of clubs hiring novices. The proﬁts
of a novice-hiring club i are then
π¯0[i|i∗] = θ¯b[i] + p¯ (1− i
∗)
i∗
− w. (3.24)
Here the ﬁxed transfer fee is multiplied by the probability that a novice will turn out to
be good enough to be sold; with two-period careers this probability must be the ratio of
veterans to novices. For a club that hires veterans the proﬁts are
π¯1[i|i∗] = a[i|i∗]b[i∗]− p¯− p[i|i∗]− w, (3.25)
where the price of talent p[i|i∗] now goes to the player as a wage.
The equality π¯0[i∗|i∗] = π¯1[i∗|i∗] is the indiﬀerence condition of the marginal ﬁrm, which
must hold for i∗ to be the equilibrium. Using a[i∗|i∗] = θ∗ (i∗) and p[i∗|i∗] = 0 it can be
rearranged to
(
θ∗ (i∗)− θ¯) b[i∗] = p¯
i∗
. (3.26)
This is almost the same as the equilibrium condition of the unregulated market (3.14),
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which was shown to be a condition for the maximization of total industry output. Setting
p¯∗ = P [i∗] will replicate the eﬃcient equilibrium condition. In other words, the optimal
ﬁxed transfer fee is equal to the average transfer fee per all jobs in the industry under
the unregulated transfer fee system. It is therefore less than the average transfer fee per
transaction in the unregulated case, which is P [i
∗]
1−i∗ . As a result of ﬁxing transfer fees at p¯
∗,
all clubs are worse oﬀ by p¯∗ while players who are good enough to be retained gain the price
of talent that used to go to discovering clubs.
This scheme only works because the novice-hiring ﬁrms are assumed to not be able to
hoard unsalable talent. To see why this requires mandatory turnover after revelation of
talent, notice that the marginal ﬁrm would strictly prefer to hold on to the threshold type
if he were available without a transfer fee. Also crucially, it was assumed that exit of ﬁrms
is not a problem. This leaves some rents at the bottom and gives leeway in rearranging the
rents without aﬀecting the distribution of talent in the industry. However, compared to a
complete abolition of transfer fees, the problem of exit by smallest clubs would be smaller
here since they at least get some transfer fee income.
To summarize, it is in principal possible to set a ﬁxed transfer fee that would replicate the
eﬃcient solution (from market-determined transfer fees), except for a shift in the division
of rents to players’ favor. This requires that clubs that hire novices are neither allowed
to retain their own ﬁnds nor to give discounts below the ﬁxed fee. The ﬁxed fee must
be thought of a retainment tax that shifts the allocation of jobs in favor of novices, and
displaces the mediocre veterans who are ineﬃciently retained in the absence of transfer fees.
Of course, the ﬁxed fee would have to be set at exactly the right level for full eﬃciency to
be attained, which would be unlikely in practice.
3.7 Conclusion
The ongoing discussion on the role of transfer fees in professional sports and on the reform
of the transfer system in the European football industry has so far ignored the importance
of experimentation and on-the-job learning.16 There has been much concern over the eﬀect
of elimination of transfer fees on clubs’ incentives to train young players, but the training
costs do not seem to justify the current levels of transfer fees. Actual playing time is scarce
16See e.g. Antonioni and Cubin (2000), Feess and Muhlheusser (2002) and Sanderson and Siegfried (1997).
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and the most signiﬁcant investment that a club can make to develop its players may be to
let them play. Given that the club will always let someone play, this is a pure opportunity
cost that does not show up in any accounting. As much as transfer fees give clubs the
right incentives to develop their players, their elimination or replacement with training-cost
reimbursements could have dire consequences for the quality of players and the game in
general. Reduced incentives for experimentation with new talent would show up as lower
turnover and an upward shift in the age distribution of players. For those who get their foot
inside the door at professional level it would be easier to stay in, and the increase in wages
for each type of player would be higher than are the current transfer fees. Not just the clubs
currently selling talent, but also the net buyers—not to mention the consumers—would be
worse oﬀ as a result.
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